THE MUSHROOM CLOUD THAT NEVER APPEARED: THE BUSH
DOCTRINE AND THE FAILURES OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE
FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

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by
Kenneth J. Knirck
Spring 2012
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ABSTRACT

THE MUSHROOM CLOUD THAT NEVER APPEARED: THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE FAILURES OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

by

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California State University, Chico

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This thesis examines the effects and influence of the neoconservative agenda on U.S. foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration. It supports the contention that neoconservative foreign policy has been detrimental to the standing of the U.S. on the global stage. The history, background, and motivations of the members of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) are explored to determine and understand their influence on formulating and executing American foreign policy prior to, and during, the Bush administration. Parallel beliefs and memberships between neoconservative operatives and staffers from earlier administrations and the Bush administration are examined. Among these people, who were highly influential in shaping the "Bush Doctrine" foreign policy are Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Richard Cheney. Key aspects of the neoconservative Bush Doctrine including preemptive
military action, regime change, and unilateral military action, are explored in detail. This thesis closely scrutinizes the role that American exceptionalism has played in the neoconservative movement. Of key importance in the discussion of neoconservative foreign policy is the U.S. war in Iraq. Seen as the embodiment of the Bush Doctrine, this paper argues that the policies and practices that shaped that conflict, served not only to undermine the influence and authority of American foreign policy, but discredited the neoconservative agenda itself.
CHAPTER I

THESIS AND INTRODUCTION

Thesis

This thesis will explore the hegemonic goals and the means for achieving those goals, as stated in the Project for a New American Century and executed by the George W. Bush Administration under the mantle of neoconservatism. Additionally, this thesis will show that the execution of these goals have been counterproductive and detrimental to the effort to maintain the United States as a superpower and the prime example of liberal democracy in the world.

Introduction

The twentieth century has been referred to as the American Century. This period saw the United States emerge as a true economic, military, and political global superpower (Knirck 2007). With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, and the end of the bipolar post-war international order, the turn of the twenty-first century found the U.S. as the sole global superpower. But as the Soviets, the old nemesis of the American conservative movement, faded, a new superpower was emerging in the East. China’s economic growth over the last twenty-five years has eroded the global market share in

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1 This thesis builds on earlier analysis written by Kenneth J. Knirck in a graduate studies course on international relations for California State University, Chico in 2006 and published in Studium Vol. 7, Spring 2007. Elements of this prior analysis appear in this introduction and in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
power from both the United States and the European Union (Knirck 2007). This growth, and the accompanying appetite for raw material and fuel, has made China a mounting threat to America’s status as the sole superpower (Knirck 2007). With this in mind, a cadre of noted conservative politicians, journalists, publishers, and strategists came together to compile a list of goals and policies that were intended to maintain and preserve America’s preeminent position on the world stage throughout the “New American Century” and impose a neoconservative foreign policy on the 2000 Republican presidential nominee. (Kristol et al. 2003).

Published in June of 1997 as an open letter to President Bill Clinton, “The Project for a New American Century” (PNAC) detailed the goals and strategies of the foundational members and architects of the neoconservative movement in American politics. With backgrounds firmly established in the “military industrial complex,” the authors and followers of PNAC strongly believed that America’s strength lies in its military might and its use of that might to spread American-style democracy (Knirck 2007). And beyond maintaining U.S. national security, the agenda of the neoconservative movement is the establishment and celebration of America as a benevolent hegemon on a civilizing mission. The result was a plan that would keep America and the rest of the world in a constant state of war. The goal of PNAC was for America to not only maintain its status as the world leader in economic and political power, but expand its reach and influence (Kristol et al. 2003).

The list of PNAC signatories reads like a who's who in the George W. Bush administration, its supporters, and its consultants. Included on the list are: Jeb Bush, brother of George W. Bush and son of the forty-first president; financial publishing
mogul Steve Forbes; political scientist and neoconservative writer Francis Fukuyama; I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney on National Security Affairs, and Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney, and Special Assistant to President George W. Bush; former Vice President under George H.W. Bush Dan Quayle; and Paul Wolfowitz, who held many State Department and Defense Department positions from the 1970s through the George W. Bush administration including Undersecretary of Defense Policy under George H.W. Bush, Deputy Secretary of Defense for George W. Bush.

The stated goals and demonstrated tactics of the PNAC neocons during the war in Iraq have hindered the effort of America to maintain its position as a world leader by weakening its strong ties with traditional allies and alienating the rest of the world to the point where economic, social, political, and military cooperation between the United States and the world has become much more difficult.

The information and conclusions that are presented in this thesis were compiled and synthesized primarily during the term of the George W. Bush administration, from January 2001 through January 2009. Because neoconservative foreign policy has been a dynamic process, whose effects continue to be felt years after the end of the Bush Administration, many of the conclusions reached in this thesis establish the destructive effect of these policies. Additionally, some of the analyses found within this work are predictive in that they describe the possible long-term negative consequences of neoconservative foreign policies on the United States and its relationship with the global community. Besides current and predictive analysis, this thesis will also conduct a brief post-mortem examination of the months following the termination of the Bush administration and the theoretical end of neoconservative foreign
policy. January 20th, 2008, the day that Barack Obama was inaugurated, will serve as the
event point in an interrupted time series analysis of neoconservative and non-
eoconservative policies and their associated effects on America’s international standing.
The enduring results of an eight year implementation of Bush Doctrine policy will be left
to future generations of political scientists and historians to study and render conclusions.
The scope of this thesis is limited to the origins, causes and effects of neoconservative
foreign policy and will not examine the social or economic policies of the George W.
Bush Administration.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF NEOCONSERVATISM

History

The roots and the motivation of the neoconservative movement can be traced back to the post-World War II Truman Doctrine and a reaction against containment policies that were present in the Truman Doctrine. Wary of the growing threat of the Soviet Union, the Truman Doctrine was a strategy and policy of containment, and not outright aggression towards the Soviet Union and its satellites. During the Cold War proxy fights in Korea and Vietnam were actively used to stem the tide of Soviet expansion. With the 1980s came the end of the Cold War and a period of détente, or a relaxation of tensions, which could be characterized as seeking balance, and avoiding, or at least minimizing, direct confrontation between the United States, its allies, and the Soviet’s sphere of influence. The cornerstone of détente was active diplomacy. President Richard M. Nixon and his National Security Advisor/Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were firm believers in détente (Caron 2005).

As Gerald R. Ford took over the presidency following Richard Nixon’s resignation on August 9th, 1974, he filled his staff and cabinet with far-right hard-liners who were not as enthusiastic about the policy of détente as Nixon and Kissinger were. Ford installed Dick Cheney as Chief of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld as the National Security
Advisor, and George H. W. Bush as the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Their concern of the Soviets inspired a more aggressive and active stand against Soviet expansion to the point where an American nuclear first-strike scenario was not out of the question. Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Paul Nitze, and a few other select members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), an organization set up by President Dwight Eisenhower, formed a group which called themselves “Team B” (Knirck 2007). This cadre of anti-communists worked to influence the Ford Administration as well as the media to promote an extremist policy of nationalism and an aggressive buildup of American military strength to fight the perceived Soviet threat. These men were the vanguard of the neoconservative movement. This group stayed in place through the Reagan Presidency and was instrumental in reinforcing Reagan’s strong anti-communist views and policies. It was at this time that Reagan began using the phrase “the Evil Empire” to describe the Soviet Union (Caron 2005).²

² On March 8, 1983, President Reagan addressed a meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. In this speech, which later became known as “The Evil Empire Speech,” Reagan voiced in no uncertain terms his belief that communism was “the focus of evil in the modern world.” This speech came at a time when the U.S. Congress was considering a resolution that would freeze the deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe and resulted in a hardening of Soviet Bloc behavior toward the U.S. (Source: Reagan, Ronald. 1983. Evil empire speech. http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganEvilEmpire1983.html (accessed June 1, 2006).

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1989 should have signaled the end of this group and their way of thinking, but exactly the opposite took place. When President Bill Clinton took office in 1993, removed all of the Cold War dinosaurs and replaced them with progressive foreign policy people. But the “Team B” group didn’t just fade away. Most of them, along with Weekly Standard magazine editor William Kristol, Richard
Perle, and Dick Cheney formed or were put on the boards at various right-wing think tanks and defense contracting companies (Barry 2004).

Team B Redux

A more detailed analysis of Team B, its actions, and its actors is helpful in understanding the motivations and ethos of George W. Bush administration’s neoconservative foreign policy. The parallels between the two are striking, and several of the key players are present in both. Of particular interest and importance is the role that Paul Wolfowitz played as an advisory member of Team B and as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Bush administration under Donald Rumsfeld.

In 1974, University of Chicago professor Albert Wohlstetter accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of consistently underestimating the Soviet missile capability, raising the issue of a “missile gap” that needed to be closed. A 1974 article in *Foreign Policy* entitled “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Wohlstetter argued that the answer to that question was no! There was no race, because Wohlsetter argued that the U.S. was passed by the Soviets. The race was over. Wohlstetter determined that what was needed was a group of “outside experts” to look at the classified data contained in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (Barry 2004). The yearly NIE is an assessment of the Soviet strategic force and is produced by using a compilation of data from the entire intelligence community, led by the CIA.

At the same time, Gerald Ford’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, began making speeches and issuing press releases stating that the Soviets were ignoring treaties and secretly building up their nuclear arsenal with the intention of fighting and
winning a nuclear war with the U.S. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was chosen as the appropriate body to challenge the CIA on its Soviet military assessments. The PFIAB was originally established as the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Affairs (BCFIA) during the Eisenhower administration and was reactivated by President Kennedy following the Bay of Pigs debacle. Appointment to the PFIAB by the President required that appointees were eligible only if they held no governmental position. Notable members included Edward Teller, John Connally, and Claire Booth Luce. The PFIAB first challenged the CIA’s Soviet threat assessments in 1975 by offering to produce competitive threat assessments. But the CIA director at the time, William Colby, scoffed at the idea that a group of non-governmental independent analysts could generate a more thorough and comprehensive report on the Soviet threat than the CIA. But in 1976, under the new Director of the CIA, George H.W. Bush, the project was approved and would come to be known as “Team B” or the “B Team,” the CIA being the “A Team” (Barry 2004).

The goals of Team B were to undermine détente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and force an increase in military expenditures. They would accomplish these goals by producing a Soviet threat assessment that was much bleaker than the one put out by the CIA (Barry 2004).

There were actually Three “B Teams,” each tasked with studying a particular aspect of the Soviet military threat. One team focused on the accuracy of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and another team studied the accuracy of Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities. But it was the third group, which examined Soviet policies and objectives, that garnered all the attention and became known as Team
B. This group was chaired by Harvard professor Richard Pipes and its members included Daniel Graham, Thomas Wolf, John Vogt, and William Van Cleave. Advisory members included Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Seymour Weiss, Jasper Welch, and Paul Wolfowitz. Staffing the team with unabashed hawks assured from the beginning that their findings would coincide with their beliefs (Cahn 1993, 22). An official at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Team B experiment, Paul Warnke stated:

> Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by 'independent' analysis of strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B enterprise was assured by the selection of the panel's members. Rather than including a diversity of views ... the Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals who made careers of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm. (Warnke 1999)

President Gerald Ford had inherited from Richard Nixon both his foreign policy based on *détente* and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who actively supported the policy. However, in the spring of 1976, Ford’s approval ratings were dismal. He attributed much of this to criticism his support for *détente* by conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties of. Ford was in a tight race to win the Republican nomination over his main challenger, Ronald Reagan. Ford barely won the February New Hampshire primary and lost primaries to Reagan in North Carolina, Nebraska, and Texas. Reagan was running on a virulent anti-communist platform that viewed détente as a vehicle for the Soviets to arm. Seeing his position as a political vulnerability, Ford abruptly deleted the word détente from his vocabulary. He made this point clear to his White House staff. “We are going to forget the use of the word détente. What happens in the negotiations…are things that are of consequence" (Garthoff 1985, 548).
By the summer of 1976, conservative opposition to *détente* and the insistence that the Soviets had surpassed the U.S. in nuclear weapons capabilities was at a fever pitch. Paul Nitze (a member of Team B) and several like-minded people created the Committee on the Clear and Present Danger (CPD) to study and warn the public about the growing threat of Soviet aggression. The CPD stated that the Soviets were playing a wholly different game than the U.S. regarding nuclear arms. Their contention was that the U.S. was relying on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the deterrence to nuclear confrontation, while the Soviets were pursuing a strategy designed to fight and win a nuclear war (Cahn 1993, 23).

Reports by Team B and the CPD stated that the Soviet Union had dramatically increased its military spending over the last ten years from 6-8 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) to 10-15 percent by 1976. What this actually meant was that the Soviet military industrial complex was grossly inefficient and was becoming a greater burden on their economy. This did not indicate a growing Soviet military threat, and this assessment did not change the Pentagon’s estimates of Soviet troop strength or their arsenal of tanks and missiles. But this information was buried in the Team B and CPD reports (Cahn 1993, 27).

Team B’s assessments were consistently skewed toward the worse case scenario and were often gross overestimations of the Soviet force. They concluded that by 1984, the Soviets would produce 500 Tupolev Tu-22 long-range supersonic bombers (NATO designation “Backfire”), when in fact the Soviet Union only produced 235 by 1984. Team B also overestimated the capabilities and technical expertise of the Soviet military industry regarding the deployment of mobile Anti-ballistic missiles, charged
particle beam weapons, and the technology for acoustically masking nuclear submarines. Clearly, Team B and the CPD had the data they needed to produce an accurate assessment of the Soviet arsenal, but they chose instead to make the intelligence fit their policy and their goals. This was a strategy that would be repeated by Wolfowitz and the neocons regarding Iraq in 2003 (Cahn 1993, 27). In *Killing Détente* (1998), Anne Hessing Cahn stated:

> With the advantage of hindsight, we now know that Soviet military spending increases began to slow down precisely as Team B was writing about an 'intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated either by the West's self-imposed restraints or by the [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)]. But even at the time of the affair, Team B had at its disposal sufficient information to know that the Soviet Union was in severe decline. As Soviet defectors were telling us in anguished terms that the system was collapsing, Team B looked at the quantity but not the quality of missiles, tanks, and planes, at the quantity of Soviet men under arms, but not their morale, leadership, alcoholism, or training. (Cahn 1998, 167)

Unfortunately, it was decades before much of this information was declassified or leaked and, therefore, challenged. The mindset that the Soviet Union was seeking, and in some cases, had achieved military superiority over the United States became the new paradigm. In an article in the *Journal of the Atomic Scientists* entitled “Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment,” Cahn lamented the lasting damage done by this group:

> When Ronald Reagan got elected, Team B became, in essence, the "A Team." For more than a third of a century, perceptions about U.S. national security were colored by the view that the Soviet Union was on the road to military superiority over the United States. Neither Team B nor the multibillion dollar intelligence agencies could see that the Soviet Union was dissolving from within. For more than a third of a century, assertions of Soviet superiority created calls for the United States to "rearm." In the 1980s, the call was heeded so thoroughly that the United States embarked on a trillion-dollar defense buildup. As a result, the country neglected its schools, cities, roads and bridges, and health care system. From the world's greatest creditor nation, the United States became the world's greatest
debt--in order to pay for arms to counter the threat of a nation that was collapsing. (Cahn 1993, 27)

The events and members associated with Team B would prove to be a foreshadowing of future intelligence manipulation. Twenty six years later, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the model of intelligence manipulation that was established by Team B in the mid 1970s was reincarnated as the Office of Special Plans (OSP). This Pentagon sub-office was headed by Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. Once again, as with Team B during the Cold War, inaccurate estimations and the practice of making the intelligence fit the policy trumped objective analysis and objective reasoning. The result in 2003 was a disastrous war in Iraq that undermined the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world.

Noecons and the Military Industrial Complex

The connection between the neocons and the defense industry is no coincidence. It’s actually a naturally symbiotic and successful relationship. The PNAC neocons strongly advocated the increase and use of military might to rid the world of what they considered threats to U.S. supremacy and the continued spread of Western liberal democracy. Neocon policies supported the market for military hardware, and the defense contractors benefited by supplying the product. In his farewell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower predicted the rise and warned of the danger of this military-industrial complex:

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly
engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. (Eisenhower 1961)

In 1997, this collection of like-minded individuals got together to form the forty-member foreign policy think tank known as the “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC).3 The policies of this group advocated a massive military defense buildup as well as an active policy of regime change to spread American-style democracy around the world. On their website, PNAC posts editorials that advocate their policies.

The opening page of the website displays the following as their credo (Knirck 2007):

The Project for the New American Century is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. The Project for the New American Century intends, through issue briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars, to explain what American world leadership entails. It will also strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement and to stimulate useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world. (Kristol 2003)

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The Psychological Justification and 
Goals of Neoconservatism

The basic tenets of neoconservative foreign policy are regime change, 
benevolent hegemony, unipolarity, military preemption, and American exceptionalism 
(Fukuyama 2006). These policies and beliefs, coupled with the moral certainty that 
America has the right and the authority to spread democracy in any way it sees necessary, 
empowered the neoconservative policy makers in the George W. Bush administration to 
establish new principles of foreign policy. Very different from the post World War I 
policies of Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Doctrine minimized the importance of diplomacy 
in favor of a “go it alone” attitude. This unilateral attitude alienated U.S. allies and 
military enemies alike (Fukuyama 2006).

Military Preemption

In his 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush openly voiced his 
disdain for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, labeling them the “Axis of Evil.” This speech 
was followed in June of 2002 by the President’s remarks during the West Point 
commencement. In this speech President Bush stated that America’s war against terror 
would not be a “defensive” war. These speeches, coupled with the publication in 
September 2002 of the National Security Strategy of the United States, made it clear that 
the "Bush Doctrine" foreign policy was one that included the use of military preemption 
against America’s perceived enemies and a willingness to forgo many of the traditional 
diplomatic channels for negotiating peace in regions of instability in the world 
(Fukuyama 2006). These belief and strategies are clearly stated in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy, specifically in the Overview (chapter I.) and in chapter V. entitled:
“Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.” (Appendix A: National Security Strategy)

Regime Change

As he pointed out in his 2002 State of the Union speech, the West Point commencement speech, and the National Security Strategy, the United States and the Bush administration were willing to use any means to spread democracy and fight the war on terror. Although these two initiatives were seemingly unrelated, the Bush administration often connected the two metaphorically, philosophically, and militarily. The use of regime change, or attempted regime change, was used regularly by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War to uphold or tear down government regimes that were unfriendly or uncooperative to the two world superpowers that were fighting their war by proxy.

Unipolarity

The collapse of the Soviet Union signaled an end to a world that was dominated by two global superpowers. The shift from a “bipolar” international stage to a “unipolar” geopolitical environment was a windfall to the neoconservative movement. Although neoconservatism has its roots in the fight against the Soviet Union and communism, few people in the movement were prepared for a world in which the United States would be the sole military and economic superpower. However, the 1990s, leading into the twenty-first Century, saw unparalleled economic growth in China. This economic growth led many to be concerned with the capability of China to become not only the predominant economic force in Asia, but the premier military force as well. China’s
ability to produce and buy new technology could put them on a global military footing similar to that of the United States. Burgeoning economies in the United Kingdom and India led many neoconservative strategists to wonder if the twenty-first century would not be the “New American Century” that they had planned on.

Morality

Deep belief in Protestant Christian values led to the settlement of the Americas by Europeans and the omni-directional spread of America’s influence. One of the core values of modern neoconservatives is their belief that they have the moral authority to spread American idealism throughout the world. Part of this idealism is the fervent belief that Protestant Christian values are synonymous with American style democracy. The neoconservative agenda of spreading morality-based democracy is seen by the movement as twenty-first century manifest destiny.

Benevolent Hegemony

The ultimate goal of the neoconservative movement is benevolent hegemony. By using whatever means necessary (regime change, military preemption), neoconservatives feel that in a unipolar geopolitical environment, the United States is uniquely qualified, positioned, and destined to be the ultimate political, moral, and military power on the planet (Fukuyama 2006).

American Exceptionalism

The belief in, and the incorporation of, the above-mentioned tenets of neoconservatism into political doctrine and government policy could not be possible without
a steadfast conviction that the United States is uniquely capable of leading the world morally, economically, and militarily. This concept of “American exceptionalism” was examined by the 19th century French philosopher Alexis De Tocqueville. Tocqueville believed that through their historical evolution, strong Protestant Christian influence, and matchless determination, Americans were capable enough and had the moral authority to succeed. This willingness to assert themselves on their surroundings was epitomized in the westward expansion of Americans through and over the territories and homelands of the Native Americans. “Manifest Destiny” based on American exceptionalism was the moral justification for American hegemony on the continents of North and South America (Tocqueville 2002). The degree to which neoconservatives have embraced this concept is very important in the understanding of their motives and rationalizations. The belief in American exceptionalism and the use of its tenets for neoconservative policy development will be discussed in greater detail in chapter III.
CHAPTER III

THE COOPTATION OF "AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM" BY THE NEOCONSERVATIVES

Introduction

This chapter will explore the history of American exceptionalism and how these tenets empowered early and modern Americans to conquer frontiers and impose their will throughout their expanding domain. An examination of this concept is essential to understand to what extent the principle of American exceptionalism has motivated, justified, and enabled the neoconservative movement to pursue and execute their policies.

The Importance of American Exceptionalism To the Neoconservative Movement

In the past four hundred years, we have witnessed the birth, death, and resurrection of American exceptionalism. The term has come to mean many things to many people. Well before our founding fathers were born, the American colonial experiment attracted hearty, adventurous people who were seeking to start life and civilization anew. Bound together by strong Protestant religious beliefs, they developed a strong work ethic, for without it they would have perished in the harsh frontiers of North America. These people felt blessed by God for the opportunity to escape the religious persecution and corruption of England. Their rugged individualism, coupled with their
strong religious and ethical standards allowed them not just to survive, but in time, to excel. Their goal was to establish societies that were better than what they had left. This spirit of individual and collective accomplishment and the desire to create something admirable motivated the colonists to succeed. The fervent belief that they had a divine right to conquer and acquire all that they saw before them instilled a sense of entitlement as well as a healthy dose of egocentrism.

To be exceptional is to be better. Each nation has its strengths, weaknesses, and unique characteristics that set it apart from other nations. But the suggestion that a nation is exceptional implies a position of superiority, or at the very least, worthy of admiration and imitation. Lauded by English writers in pamphlets and bragged about by philosophers in the salons of Europe, the American spirit and their reformationist accomplishments were hailed as exceptional (Appleby 1992).

This spirit lives on in modern American society and has permeated not only the minds of the public, but the halls of government. The American neoconservative movement has its basis in the exceptionalist nature of America. With the acquisition and retention of money and power as their goals, the neo-conservative movement uses their belief in God as their justification for social, political, and economic supremacy.

Using the justification of American exceptionalism, the neoconservative movement has been able to unabashedly pursue a domestic and international agenda that places the United States in the role of benevolent hegemon. The “Bush Doctrine” of unipolarity, nation building, and preemptive military actions would not be possible without a deep-seated belief that what they (the neoconservatives) were doing was justifiable under the dogma of American exceptionalism.
The History of American Exceptionalism

On an empirical level American Exceptionalism has come to be defined as the many ways that America is different from most European countries, in its establishment, in its evolution, and in its current incarnation. The concept was extensively written about by French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, a work in which Tocqueville published his observations of America and its people in 1835. His conclusions were based on a comparison of Europe and America. In most cases, Tocqueville was impressed with the state of American democracy and American society in general. The American free press, the means for producing literature, and the Americans’ appetite for information impressed Tocqueville. America’s religious zeal was also different from that of most Europeans at the time. As one who steadfastly supported the spiritual aspects of religious life, but also the positive social dividends that come from organized religion, Tocqueville expressed his belief in the religiosity of Americans as the cornerstone of their classically liberal and egalitarian philosophy toward republican democracy by stating: “Liberty cannot be established without morality, nor morality without faith” (Townhall.com 2010).

In addition to religious fervor, Tocqueville found several other traits that were not unique to Americans, but uniquely American in their strength, as compared to Europeans. The American desire to attain material wealth, was seen by Tocqueville as somewhat disturbing. Although tempered by their Protestant religious values, the acquisition of wealth in comparison to nineteenth century Europeans was very apparent to Tocqueville. On this fact he lamented: “As one digs deeper into the national character of the Americans, one sees that they have sought the value of everything in this world
only in the answer to this single question: how much money will it bring in?"
(Tocqueville 2002).

Tocqueville observed that Americans were strongly dedicated to egalitarianism, liberty, individualism, and laissez-faire principles. His explanations for these principles are three-fold. First, that Americans came to a continent that was geographically isolated, expansive and mostly uninhabited. Second, that the American legal system was federalist in nature and enjoyed an independent judiciary. Lastly, Tocqueville found that Americans’ religious traditions had helped them to form certain “habits of the heart” (Wilson 2006).

The exceptional nature of the American political process and the success of America in terms of socio-economic accomplishments is an amalgam of factors. Strong Protestant ethics, a deep desire to succeed as individuals and as a country, coupled with geographic isolation and abundant natural resources made Americans feel “blessed” and exceptional. This ethos supported westward expansion and the taming of the wilderness at the expense of the native inhabitants (Shafer 1992).

The Empirical Face of American Exceptionalism

The empirical interpretation of American Exceptionalism is based on the observation that American culture and government are distinct from most European and Asian countries. The basis for this difference may be in the shared American values and beliefs. This American creed is based on several core beliefs, many of which were observed by Tocqueville in the 1830s, and have grown with time to be pillars of the American belief system.
Seymour Martin Lipset sees this “American creed” as something that was born out of America’s unique birth as a breakaway nation. As the “first new nation,” the United States arose out of the Revolutionary War as a country that lacked feudal structures, aristocracies, and monarchical rulers. In an effort to distinguish themselves from their European roots, the American people developed a strong sense of egalitarianism, liberalism, populism, individualism, and moralism (Lipset 1996). The embracing of these values and their continued development into the modern era has produced a “double-edged sword” with both positive and negative effects on American society. “It fosters a high sense of personal responsibility, individual initiative, and volunteerism even as it encourages self-serving behavior, atomism, and a disregard for communal good” (Lipset 1996, 268).

In the early twentieth century, the term American exceptionalism came to be seen as the differentiation of American socio-economics from that of Europe and Asia. The rise and spread of Soviet socialism in the 1920s and the increasing socialist political tendencies in Europe showed a dramatic difference between the American socio-economic philosophy and that of its neighbors across the Atlantic. While most governments in industrialized nations were heavily investing in social programs such as public health care and strong trade organizations, American policies toward social welfare programs were lagging far behind those of the rest of the industrialized world. The lack of any sustained or widespread radical socialist movement in the United States is indicative of the exceptional nature of the American socio-economic political philosophy when compared to the success of such movements in Europe and Asia (Lipset 1991).
The fact that America has lagged far behind the rest of the world in adopting and supporting strong social welfare programs in favor of keeping individual and corporate income taxes relatively low, and continues to have one of the largest wealth disparities among its people, may not simply be an indication of American greed and anti-egalitarianism. Most European democracies are parliamentary. In these cases public policy is easily and rapidly changed to suit the will of the people, as opposed to the American presidential system in which policy change is exceedingly slow and deliberate. Additionally, Tocqueville found that because they had escaped religious persecution in England and came to the new world with religious values that were both “democratic and republican,” and that since the government was not establishing, endorsing, or fiscally supporting the church, the work of spreading religion among the masses was left up to “spiritual entrepreneurs” and not state-sponsored religious entities (Wilson 2006).

The Normative Face of American Exceptionalism

The positive connotation of American exceptionalism is the idea that America set itself apart from the feudal and aristocratic societies of Europe to become the epitome of liberal democracy. Founded on Protestant religious reforms and Puritan moral ethics, Americans sought to establish themselves as the archetypical democracy, one that was blessed by God with an abundance of natural resources and the spirit of rugged individualism that would help them conquer the frontier. This sense of moral certainty and divine providence served Americans well. Through their determination, individualism, and divine inspiration, they succeeded in establishing the American way of life. However, this same moral certainty and ambition led them to massacre the native
populations with impunity. “Manifest Destiny” and the egocentric and jingoistic acts that it allowed the new Americans to perpetrate are the direct result of the moral certainty of American exceptionalism. Again, the embodiment of American exceptionalism can be seen as a sword that cuts both ways. Seen in one light it is the shining example for those who wish to follow. And in another light, it is the embodiment of self-importance and the distorted moral justification for the acts of the self-interested.

The credence in American exceptionalism has waxed and waned throughout the last century. America’s involvement in what many people around the world viewed as an unjust war in Vietnam contributed significantly to the decline of the moral credentials of the United States and its status as exceptional. The political corruption of the Nixon administration further eroded the standing of the U.S. government both domestically and internationally. Although Nixon’s success in opening up diplomatic ties with China was seen universally as positive.

The effect of American exceptionalism on foreign policy shifted several times throughout the Twentieth Century. Wilsonian isolationism showed the world that America was different from many world powers in that it did not seek to establish itself as an empire. Later twentieth century presidents such as Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton sought to assuage foreign distrust of American might by engaging in peace keeping missions rather than nation building or empire building. By using international treaty organizations such as NATO and the U.N. to garner international support for foreign military actions, the Carter, Clinton, George H. W. Bush administrations, and to a certain extent the Reagan administration, were able to portray America in a favorable light. U.S.
human rights campaigns in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia helped instill international appreciation and respect for American benevolence throughout the 1990s.

Just as the Twentieth Century was often referred to by historians as the “American Century” due to the emergence of the United States as a global economic, industrial, and military superpower, the reference of the twenty-first Century as the “New American Century” by neoconservatives echoes their belief and fervent hope that the U.S. would remain as the sole global superpower.

Besides their unabashed goal of American preeminence, the founders and board members of PNAC were strategically positioned within the George W. Bush administration to promote their neoconservative agenda. With a heavy emphasis on “traditional values” and “spreading democracy,” the Bush administration and the neoconservative policy makers closely intertwine domestic and international politics with religious language and inflection.

The connection of the neoconservative movement to religious regressives is undeniable. The very first two executive orders of the George W. Bush presidency EO 13198 (Appendix B), and EO 13199 (Appendix C), both signed on Jan. 29, 2001 were designed to increase the access to federal funding of social programs to faith-based organizations.

Steeped in religious language, the speeches of George W. Bush consistently praised the moral and ethical righteousness of the American way of life and the need to share it with the world. As he stated in a speech in New Orleans in 2004: "We want to fund programs that save Americans one soul at a time" (Bush 2004). Often reminiscent of John Winthrop’s 1630 sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity,” in which he envisions
the new American colonies as shining examples of moral clarity, virtue, and
egalitarianism, this “city upon a hill” is an oft used reference by the neoconservative
movement. References to biblical passages and hymns, whether overt or covert, became
commonplace in the neoconservative vernacular. By declaring groups of people, or
nations as a whole, into binary categories of good and evil, the neoconservatives strive to
set America above the rest of the world as the leader of the free world. There are
numerous examples of this type of exceptionalist rhetoric in the speeches of George W.
Bush. On September 14th, 2001, he stated in his address to the nation from the National
Cathedral: “It is our responsibility to history to rid the world of evil” (Bush 2001). And in
his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared: “As our nation moves
troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling
as a blessed country is to make this world better” (Bush 2003). Michael Gerson, a long-
time Bush speech writer, defended his use of religious language and affirmed Bush’s
belief in American exceptionalism. Commenting on George W. Bush’s frequent use of
the phrase: “freedom is not America's gift to the world, it's the almighty God's gift to all
humanity,” Gerson noted that those are the President’s own words and that they were: “a
repudiation of the kind of American exceptionalism that holds that God has chosen the
United States as his special instrument, and an echo of Abraham Lincoln's assertion that
Americans should strive to be on God's side rather than claiming that God is on their
side” (Cooperman 2004, A06).

Under the guise of moral certainty and faith bestowed upon them from on-
high, the practitioners of neoconservative foreign and domestic policy have taken it upon
themselves to lead in a way that they alone are capable of. William Kristol, son of Irving
Kristol and the publisher of several ultra-conservative magazines and a board member of the conservative American Enterprise Institute, is the founder and chairman of PNAC. As stated in their credo: “The Project for the New American Century is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle” (Kristol 1996).

In an ideal world, the normative function of American exceptionalism would be the standard. Unfortunately, the actions of the neoconservative policy makers do not coincide with their self-appointed status as moral the authority. Michael Ignatieff has observed several modern variants of exceptionalism practiced by America and, from time to time, other nations. The first type of exceptionalism he labels as “exemptionalism” in which America supports international agreements only if it is exempt from its provisions. Examples of this include the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the insisted upon exemption in the International Land Mines Treaty. What Ignatieff refers to as the "double standard" variant of American exceptionalism allows America and its allies to be judged by less stringent standards than the rest of the world, and that American domestic law has jurisdiction over the laws of other nations (Ignatieff 2005, 3-6).

Much like the decline in public opinion and moral leadership ability declined during America’s military presence in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, the Bush administration’s aggressive neoconservative agenda served to diminish America’s moral authority. The administration’s foreign policy of preemptive war in Iraq, the callous treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and the diminution of
American civil liberties under the auspices of the war on terror, served to undermine the moral credibility of the Bush Administration and the neoconservative movement, and by association, the United States.

The term “American exceptionalism” has come to mean many things to many people. By examining the executed policies and actions of the neoconservative movement, as opposed to their stated policies and rhetoric, it’s difficult to conclude that the motivations for their actions were not greed, power, and class warfare. In *Worse than Watergate*, John Dean, the former White House counsel to Richard Nixon concluded that the actual goals of the Bush administration were to: Create a perpetual state of war in order to benefit the military-industrial complex; increase military spending and cut taxes to create unfathomable public debt to facilitate the third goal; de-funding and dismantling the American social welfare system (Dean 2004). Yet neo-conservatives, as stated in the PNAC manifesto, steadfastly continue to claim the moral high ground and with it the unique and exceptional qualifications to lead the United States and the world in the twenty-first century.

Rapidly growing economies (and the military might that accompanies such growth) in China, India, and the European Union are threats to the hegemonic goals of the neoconservative movement. Expansion and domination of economic power accumulators such as the American military-industrial complex and the international oil and gas industry are necessary to prevent foreign entities from displacing American operations from those growing foreign regions. The Bush administration’s policy of American expansionism and nation-building were necessary to achieve the goals of the neoconservative movement. Through their actions, the neocons showed themselves to be
the antithesis of the type of moral clarity, egalitarianism, and Protestant religious values that Tocqueville saw as the basis for American exceptionalism.

Conclusion

The neoconservative movement stepped beyond patriotism into jingoism and beyond moral clarity into moral superiority. The result was a growing tide of anti-Americanism during the George W. Bush administration. The colonists and the Founders had the vision and the courage to carve a unique civilization out of the wilderness of North America. With well-intentioned moral and religious beliefs, the early Americans established a model for liberal democracy. Fueled by the classic American traits that Alexis De Tocqueville recognized in the 1830s, the United States grew into the foremost economic and military superpower. But concerned about the threat to America’s status as sole global superpower from burgeoning countries and economies like China, India, and the European Union, the neoconservatives took it upon themselves to use their positions of governmental and corporate power to solidify the position of the United States as the sole superpower. Using the rhetoric of exceptionalism, neoconservatives promoted the idea that the world needed a benevolent hegemon to maintain global stability and to spread (or impose) American-style democracy. And in their view, America was and is uniquely qualified to fill that role.
CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGY OVER NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE LAW

Introduction

One of the unfortunate of the PNAC neoconservative is the willingness to place ideology over national interest. America and the world bought into the justification for the invasion of Afghanistan as a retaliatory move against the Taliban and the attacks of September 11, 2001. But the redeployment and redistribution of the American military assets from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003 indicated that they had their eyes on a different prize.

What became abundantly clear in the following years was a willingness by the PNAC/neoconservatives to circumvent, rewrite, reinterpret, or ignore American and international law. Indifference to the environment, basic human rights, human dignity, and legal due process became the well known trademarks of the neoconservative movement. Amnesty International reported evidence of widespread mistreatment of “detainees” in American-operated prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba. Because they were not classified as prisoners of war by the Bush Administration but as “enemy

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4 Extends earlier analysis written by Kenneth J. Knirck in a graduate studies course on international relations for California State University, Chico in 2006 and published in Studium Vol. 7, Spring 2007. Elements of this prior analysis appear in this introduction and in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
combatants,” a legally ambiguous term coined by the Administration, these uncharged and often undocumented prisoners were afforded none of the legal due process or basic human rights that are guaranteed to them under the United States Constitution or the Geneva Conventions. And unlike other wars, the “war on terrorism” is undefined, undeclared, and never-ending. In past wars, prisoners were held for “the duration” of the war. In this case, the duration means forever. In his report, Amnesty International U.S.A. Senior Deputy Director-General Curt Goering noted:

Evidence continues to emerge of widespread torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees held in U.S. custody. The U.S. government is not only failing to take steps to eradicate torture, it is actually creating a climate in which torture and other ill-treatment can flourish. Although the U.S. government continues to assert its condemnation of torture and ill-treatment, these statements contradict what is happening in practice. Like other wars, when they start, we do not know when they will end. Still, we may detain combatants until the end of the war. (Waddington 2006)

In 2006, under the Freedom of Information Act, the Associated Press acquired a list of detainees who were being held at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba. The names of approximately 490 prisoners from 40 countries held on the island were known to the Red Cross, but the Bush Administration did not give them permission to release the list (Garwood 2006). Donald Rumsfeld characterized the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as “the worst of the worst.” At a Defense Department briefing, referring to the prisoners Rumsfeld said:

If you think of the people down there, these are people, all of whom were captured on a battlefield… They're terrorists, trainers, bomb makers, recruiters, financiers, [Osama bin Laden's] bodyguards, would-be suicide bombers, probably the 20th 9/11 hijacker.” And Air Force General Richard Myers added: “They were so vicious, if given the chance they would gnaw through the hydraulic lines of a C-17 while they were being flown to Cuba. These are the people that don't know any moral values…and the threat they pose is real - at least 12 former detainees have been killed or captured on the battlefield after their release. (Fisher 2006)
During Saddam Hussein’s rule, the prison at Abu Ghraib was infamous with the people of Iraq for its brutal conditions and harsh treatment of its prisoners. Torture was commonplace. But before the war, this place was only known to the Iraqis. After the fall of Baghdad, the prison was taken over by U.S. forces. Unfortunately, under U.S. control, it was the same prison with the same conditions and the same systematic abuse and torture. It was just under new management. It came to light in the international press that the American military, with the help of the CIA, had been running the prison like a gulag. Most of these prisoners, like those at Guantanamo Bay had not been formally arrested or charged with crimes, other than that of being accused by their rivals or sold out for bounty (Knirck 2007). The Administration’s line always had been that the abuse and killing at Abu Ghraib was the work of “a few bad apples” and not a systemic or command problem. A handful of low-level staff at the prison has been tried for their crimes, and a few have been convicted. But upper-level staff and higher-ranking management have been immune from prosecution (Knirck 2007). They were simply transferred to different duty stations.

Although slow in coming, holding the officers and managers of the prison to account for their actions was a good start at exposing the scandalous behavior and cleaning up the system. But the responsibility for the abuses at American-run prisons apparently went all the way to the top of the command chain. It was reported that while being interrogated at Guantanamo Bay, Muhammad al-Qahtani, sometimes referred to as “the twentieth hijacker,” was systematically abused and humiliated in numerous illegal and quasi-legal ways including numerous instances of "water-boarding." In an investigation conducted by Lt. General Randall Schmidt, the abuses were confirmed by
the commander of Guantanamo Bay, Major General Geoffrey Miller. General Miller also
admitted that al-Qahtani was their “number one” prisoner and that Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld was aware of and condoned the interrogation tactics. Much of this
interrogation was in accordance with a Rumsfeld directive (later rescinded) that approved
sixteen questionable interrogation techniques. In testimony about the investigation,
General Schmidt reported: "...this is approved to be used in special circumstances which I
[Rumsfeld] will approve, and it's for Mister Khatani, number one." Continued Schmidt:
"The Secretary of Defense is personally involved in the interrogation . . . and the
Secretary of Defense is personally being briefed on this" (Schmitt 2006). Stated Joanne
Mariner of Human Rights Watch: “The question at this point is not whether Secretary
Rumsfeld should resign, it's whether he should be indicted" (Rothschild 2006).

On August 29 2009 Bush administration internal memos from 2004 and 2005
were obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union under the Freedom of Information
Act (ACLU 2009). The memos revealed that torture techniques and approval for the use
of these techniques had circulated through the Bush White House, Justice Department,
and the Pentagon (ACLU 2009). These documents revealed that with the knowledge and
approval of the President, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and White House
counsel Alberto Gonzales, numerous instances of torture had been carried upon suspected
terrorists and terrorist supporters within the wall of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba, as well as several "black sites" throughout
the world (ACLU 2009). These acts were in violation of the Geneva Conventions and the
1996 War Crimes Act (ACLU 2009).
The Bush Administration however, disagreed with the assumption that these acts were illegal. In January of 2002, a series of memos from John Yoo, a legal counsel at the Justice Department, were sent to senior members of the Bush Administration. Yoo's legal analysis of the interrogation techniques determined that they were not in violation of international law regarding the torture of detainees. This legal analysis and approval was confirmed by Alberto Gonzales and forwarded to the President. Secretary of State Colin Powell quickly responded to these memos and approvals by stating that the administration's declaration that the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable under these circumstances would serve to "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the laws of war for our troops" (Powell 2005). He further added that such actions and policies would "undermine public support among critical allies" (Powell 2005).

Over the next several years, the Bush Administration continued to hold steadfast in its determination that the interrogation techniques that were employed were legal and justified. President Bush stated on many occasions that "Americans don't use torture." And Donald Rumsfeld opined that the Geneva Conventions were outdated and "quaint." In an attempt to provide legal cover, George Bush signed Executive Order 13440 (Appendix D) on July 20, 2007 which affirmed those legal conclusions of his administration and its legal staff. The order reads in part:

Section 1. General Determinations. (a) The United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Members of al Qaeda were responsible for the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, and for many other terrorist attacks, including against the United States, its personnel, and its allies throughout the world. These forces continue to fight the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and they continue to plan additional acts of terror throughout the world. On February 7, 2002, I determined for the
United States that members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces are unlawful enemy combatants who are not entitled to the protections that the Third Geneva Convention provides to prisoners of war. I hereby reaffirm that determination. (b) The Military Commissions Act defines certain prohibitions of Common Article 3 for United States law, and it reaffirms and reinforces the authority of the President to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions. (Bush 2007)

These findings and revelations regarding the Bush Administration's harsh and possibly illegal treatment of detainees, as well as the blatant disregard for the rule of international law, caused a great deal of furor both inside and outside the United States. This served to further undermine the status of America as the standard of adherence to international law and morality. On January 22nd, 2009, as one of his first acts as President, Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13491 (Appendix E), which repealed Executive Order 13440 and affirmed the adherence by the United States to the Geneva Conventions and other international laws regarding the mistreatment of detainees. The order stated:

Ensuring Lawful Interrogations
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering, to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel who are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, I hereby order as follows: Section 1. Revocation. Executive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, is revoked. All executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order. Heads of departments and agencies shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all directives, orders, and regulations of their respective departments or agencies are consistent with this order. Upon request, the Attorney General shall provide guidance about which directives, orders, and regulations are inconsistent with this order. (Obama 2009)
On the same day, in a further effort to reverse the wrongdoings of his predecessor and improve the standing of the U.S. in the eyes of the international community, President Obama issued two accompanying executive orders. In Executive Order 13492 (Appendix F) which stated his intentions to close Guantanamo Bay Prison, and in Executive Order 13493 (Appendix G), he set up a special interagency task force to identify and develop legal options for the treatment of detainees related to armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.

In upper management positions, neoconservatives like George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and Alberto Gonzales indicated a blatant disregard for the rule of law…the very thing that used to be the prime example of freedom and democracy in the world. Their actions regarding the treatment of prisoners served more to undermine the respect of U.S. foreign policy than they did in administering to the safety of the American people, which they claimed to be of paramount importance.
CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY PILLAR OF NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

Introduction

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the United States ascended to the position of sole global super-power. America’s victory in the Cold War over the threat of advancing communism was not the direct result of military superiority in U.S./U.S.S.R. proxy wars like Korea and Vietnam, but the inability of the Soviet economy to keep pace with the arms race between these two super-powers (Barry 2004). The 1980s Reagan administration policies, which included lower taxes and increased military spending, produced record federal budget deficits, peaking in 1986 at $221 billion (Congressional Budget Office 1986). Under President Reagan, defense spending went from $134.6 billion in 1980 to $304 billion in fiscal 1989 (Congressional Budget Office 1986). In terms of a percentage of the gross domestic product, the 1986 defense budget accounted for 6.2 percent of the GDP (Congressional Budget Office 1986). Fortunately, the U.S. economy could handle the arms race better than the Soviet economy, which collapsed under the weight of this escalation.

For billions of people around the world, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War meant the hope for a new era of security, stability, and prosperity.
But for the neoconservative branch of the American political Right, the end of the Cold War meant that new enemies needed to be found to justify the continued build-up of American military might around the globe. One of the early preachers of the neoconservative gospel was Norman Podhoretz. In his view, military power was “the indispensable foundation of American foreign policy ...without it, nothing else we do will be effective” (Podhoretz 1982, 4).

The neoconservative credo, as outlined by Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, George Weigel, and others, laid out six key persuasions for the rationalization of expanded military might in the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War world. First, is the conviction that evil is real, and that the U.S. is uniquely capable, morally and militarily, of fighting evil. This American exceptionalist theory runs through much of the neoconservative ethos. The second proposition is that power is essential to execute foreign policy (fight evil), and there is no substitute for military power. The third proposition is that American values are universal, and that other countries should welcome them as a proper substitute for their own traditional possibly misguided, values. The fourth proposition is related to the third in that traditional American values should be the basis for American domestic social policy, and not the liberal indulgences of the New Left movement of the 1960s and 1970s. These include multiculturalism, radical feminism, gay rights, and affirmative action. The fifth proposition of the neoconservative credo is that America must aggressively fight any crisis that comes up. The sixth proposition is that the key to combating a crisis is strong leadership (Bacevich 2005). They found the image of strong leadership, both moral and militarily, in George W. Bush, as well as someone who was moldable to the neoconservative mindset.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the revolution of military affairs in the 1990s, and the enthusiasm of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton to utilize low-risk, high-tech, long-range weapons systems helped set the stage for the exploitation of the military gap that existed between the U.S. and the rest of the global field of players. So when the George W. Bush Administration took office, with its roster well-packed with neoconservative thinkers, the neocons envisioned an opportunity to see their agenda for American hegemony come to fruition. The upper echelon of the Bush administration’s civilian defense management was comprised almost entirely of members of the Project for a New American Century including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who is credited as the primary architect of the Bush Doctrine (Kristol 1996). This strategy, as designed by Wolfowitz and the other members of PNAC, was designed several years before the events of September 11, 2001. It was this event that gave the Bush Doctrine the legs, if not the legitimacy, to be actively implemented by the Administration.

In a striking reversal of the Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence, the Bush Doctrine was built on four pillars. First, the “strategy of preemption” was adopted to move the militarily against “rogue states” that posed an (imminent) threat to the U.S. and her allies. President Bush identified the three leading contenders for this title in his 2002 State of the Union Address as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The idea that democratic values are universal, and should be spread throughout the world, is the second
pillar of the Bush Doctrine. This component was used to give moral justification to the actions of the Bush Administration and could also be used as a backup, when the evidence for the use of preemptive military force was invalidated, as was the evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The third pillar of the Bush Doctrine is the use of unilateral action. This is a reversal of the Powell Doctrine which required the cooperation and approval of U.S. allies and international bodies. Related to the policy of unilateral action is the fourth pillar of the Bush Doctrine, that global order is best maintained by a single, militarily dominant state (Hendrickson 2005, 1-22).

Empire or Hegemon

In its position as sole global super-power, the United States is clearly in a position that is unequal in its scope of political, economic, and military influence. The question is: does the power that the U.S. possesses, in conjunction with the policies and actions of the Bush Administration, make the U.S. a hegemonic power or empire either actual or prima fascia? Historian Paul Schroeder defines the difference by saying: “A hegemon is first among equals; an imperial power rules over subordinates" (Schroeder 2003, 2). More precisely, the distinction boils down to political control. Does one entity have the authority to make critical political decision for a subordinate state entity? In Schroeder’s opinion, America is not an empire yet. But it is well on its way, pushed toward that end by neoconservative imperial policies, ambitions, and goals. Given the conquest, occupation, and political control of Iraq by the United States, a good argument can be made that the U.S., if it's not already an empire, is certainly an empire in training (Schroder 2003). But despite the outward appearance of imperial power, and quite
possibly the capability of becoming an empire, the U.S. lacks the ability and/or willingness to use the political control necessary to dictate the internal and external policy decisions of subordinate states, thus making the U.S. a true imperial power (Eikenberry 1989, 375-400).

The continued overbuilding of the U.S. military is something that must be maintained if the neoconservative goal of continued economic dominance is to be backed up by military dominance. Imperial powers or quasi-imperial powers are characterized as possessing dominant military strength. While it is true that the U.S. military is capable of defeating any given state, this overwhelming power cannot simultaneously overcome several strong states, or a multitude of relatively weak states. An economy of force is necessary, as is the ability to place and use armies without undermining the overall effectiveness of the fighting forces (Rosen 2003, 71). The Athenians had the ability to defeat any given island state in the Mediterranean, but they did not have sufficient forces to defeat all of these states. Therefore, the Melians had to be destroyed, to send a message to the other states that standing up to Athens was impossible (Waldron 1990).

Neoconservative political writer Max Boot unabashedly states that, “[o]n the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century...and the U.S. should definitely embrace the practice” (Boot 2003, 1). He also points out that America has been an empire since the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 as part of what Thomas Jefferson called the “empire of liberty” (Boot 2003, 1). Fellow neoconservative, and architect of the Bush Doctrine, Paul Wolfowitz agrees with the notion that American leadership through imperialism is a positive thing, and he sees it as the “savior of humanity” (Schlesinger 2005, 43-46). Neoconservative scholar and writer...
Charles Krauthammer agrees that the United States is in a unique position of power at this point in history, and the U.S. should use this to its advantage. States Krauthammer: “America is no mere citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations, and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will” (Krauthammer 2001, 3). American expansionism, and the accompanying justifications for it, have played a part in virtually every chapter in the growth of the United States. Whether the term used for the territorial and political expansion of the U.S. is manifest destiny, natural growth, natural right, geographic predestination, or political gravitation, America has a long and often bloody history of outward growth (Weinberg 1935).

The exceptional qualities that Toqueville saw embodied in nineteenth-century Americans were qualities that made Americans uncomfortable with the status quo. Dynamic change was in their nature. Robert Kagan declared:

The United States has never been a status quo power; it has always been a revolutionary one, consistently expanding its participation and influence in the world in ever-widening arcs. The impulse to involve ourselves in the affairs of others is neither a modern phenomenon nor a deviation from the American spirit. It is embedded in the American DNA. (Kagan 2006, 1)

The Question of Legitimacy

The power and influence that the U.S. currently enjoys is unprecedented and undeniable. But, when a powerful state wields its power, the acceptance of its actions by others is dependant upon the legitimacy (or perceived legitimacy) of its authority to use that power.
Legitimacy arises from the conviction that state action issues from rightful authority, that is, from the political institution authorized to take it; and second, that it does not violate a legal or moral norm. Ultimately, however, legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and thus actions that are unlawful in either of these senses may, in principle, still be deemed legitimate. This is why it is an elusive quality. Despite these vagaries, there can be no doubt that legitimacy is a vital thing to have, and illegitimacy a condition to be avoided. (Tucker and Hendrickson 2004)

In the months immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the American people and the Bush administration were showered with good will and support throughout the world. However, the hardliners in the Bush administration insisted upon alienating many of America’s traditional allies by questioning their relevance on the modern global playing field. The neoconservative Bush administration’s diplomatic style increasingly marginalized “Old Europe,” claiming that they, France, Germany etc., were unsupportive of the U.S. effort to stop terrorism. And by the time that the U.S. launched its military strike against Iraq in March 2003, public opinion of the Bush administration had waned considerably. In international opinion polls, favorable ratings for the U.S. dropped between twenty and fifty percent between 2001 and 2003 (Hendrickson 2005, 1-22).

The erosion of the legitimacy of the Bush Administration through the implementation of Bush Doctrine military policies was full-spectrum, in that all four pillars of legitimacy that the U.S. enjoyed in the post-World War II era were destroyed. Those pillars being: (1) the adherence of the U.S. to international law; (2) international cooperation in decision-making; (3) moderation in policy; and (4) the preservation of peace and prosperity between industrialized democracies (Tucker and Hendrickson 2004).
Each of these constructs was ignored by the Bush Administration. Their policy of extraordinary rendition and torture of prisoners, their dismissal of the Geneva Conventions as “quaint” and “outdated,” their marginalization of the United Nations, and their Middle-East policies that have escalated tensions in that area have all worked to undermine the legitimacy of the United States and the Bush Administration (Leavitt 2004).

Hard Power v. Soft Power

Political scientist and former Under-Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye offers a concise definition of the multi-faceted concept of power:

Power is the ability to influence others and there are three ways to accomplish that. Threaten them with sticks, induce them with carrots, or entice them with values and culture. But soft power—the power to attract—would save a lot in blood and treasure. (Nye 2004, 9)

The insistence of the neoconservative Bush administration on relying almost entirely upon “hard power,” the strength of its military and economic might, for the implementation of its foreign policy, to the virtual exclusion of its diplomatic assets may historically be proven to be the downfall of their agenda. The Bush Administration downplayed the effectiveness of soft power to persuade other countries to side with U.S. interests. By utilizing this additional tool, the Bush Administration, and subsequent neoconservative administrations, could be much more effective in implementing their agenda of military and economic hegemony. Their use of hard power has been very effective in turning the world against the U.S. They need to understand that the winning of hearts and minds is an essential skill when one is operating in the large sphere of international politics. The invasion phase of the Iraq war was a successful demonstration
of American hard power. But the ineffective use of soft power made the occupation and reconstruction phase a prolonged disaster because few nations were willing to assist the U.S in its mission (Nye 2004, 9).

Conclusion

The goal of the neoconservative agenda of maintaining American sole super-power status is unachievable without the unequaled might of the U.S. military. However, the gap in their understanding of the big picture of the geopolitical game has hindered their effectiveness. By not utilizing diplomatic carrots as well as sticks the neocons severely limited themselves to a one-tool toolbox, the hammer. And according to the old adage: When the only thing you have is a hammer, everything tends to look like a nail. The lack of imagination, flexibility, and just plain competence made neoconservatism, in the words of one of their most respected modern practitioners, Francis Fukuyama, a “failed experiment” (Fukuyama 2006, 2).
CHAPTER VI

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MILITARY AGENDA IN ACTION

Introduction

In 1998, PNAC sent an open letter to President Clinton urging the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Knirck 2007). Both of these policy recommendations were rejected by the Clinton Administration which favored a drawdown of the military and a hands-off approach to regime change and nation building. The Clinton Administration actively pursued peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and several rigorous cruise missile attacks on sites in Iraq where it was suspected that Weapons of Mass Destruction were being manufactured and stored.

As detailed in chapter two of this thesis, when George W. Bush took over the presidency in 2001, he quickly reconstituted the Team B crowd, many of whom were closely associated with the Project for a New American Century think tank, and installed them in his cabinet and White House staff (Knirck 2007). Donald Rumsfeld became the new Secretary of Defense with Paul Wolfowitz as his Deputy and Richard Perle as the Assistant Secretary of Defense. And Vice President Dick Cheney took on I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby as his Chief of Staff. The George W. Bush Administration was now well-stocked with neoconservative policy makers. And in his 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush echoed the goals of the PNAC neocons. These included a massive
military buildup, aggressively pushing American interests throughout the world, a willingness to ignore traditional alliances and act unilaterally, and the not-so-veiled threat of preemptory attacks on potentially hostile countries.

Iraq: The Neocon’s Big Blunder

The Bush Administration will always be known as the first neoconservative administration. Likewise, the war in Iraq will always be known as the first war waged by the neoconservatives. To give them credit, the Bush neocons did not only talk the talk, they walked the walk. When the opportunity arose, the neocon war machine jumped into action. With questionable military intelligence, the Bush Administration wasted little time in convincing itself, if not the United Nations and the rest of the world, that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that he intended to use them on the United States, the U.K., and/or Israel. The Administration also frequently implied that Saddam Hussein was in some way connected to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. But the ulterior motive of regime change, as unabashedly promoted by PNAC, was not immediately mentioned by the Bush Administration as a reason for the invasion (Knirck 2007).

For months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, in every media venue available, Bush Administration officials and aides proclaimed with certainty that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction in several forms. These officials included Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and C.I.A. Director George Tenet, who, in a briefing with President Bush
confirmed that the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a justification for the invasion of Iraq was “a slam dunk” (Tenet 2004).

On February 5th, 2003, Colin Powell made a presentation to the United Nations Security Council. This presentation was intended to convince the United Nations and the world that the U.S. had ample justification for an invasion of Iraq. Powell opened his presentation by saying:

The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community. (Powell 2003)

The presentation included audio and video recordings, PowerPoint slides, satellite photographs, a prop vial of anthrax, and various technical diagrams. The sources of this evidence of Saddam Hussein’s possession and intent to use WMD were gleaned from intercepted communications, defectors, and detainees. Seated behind Powell was George Tenet. Powell concluded by stating:

For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows: intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition. We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk for
the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world. My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continue defiance of this Council. My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance. We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body. Thank you, Mr. President. (Powell 2003)

Unfortunately for Powell and the Bush administration, the evidence provided in this presentation, as well as the Iraqi intelligence that was widely disseminated by the neoconservative brain trust both inside and outside of the administration, was inaccurate, outdated, distorted, coerced, and/or purchased from dubious sources with their own ulterior motives. Powell's Chief of Staff, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, assisted Secretary Powell in the construction of the U.N. presentation. Powell’s trusted aide was suspicious of the intelligence material and its sources from the beginning. The information that was given to Powell and Wilkerson by the C.I.A. and the N.S.A. had clearly been cherry-picked by the Whitehouse. In a CNN documentary piece in 2005, Wilkerson reflected on the process of creating the U.N. presentation. In one of his first meetings on the subject with Powell, Wilkerson noted:

(Powell) came through the door ... and he had in his hands a sheaf of papers, and he said, ‘This is what I’ve got to present at the United Nations according to the White House, and you need to look at it,’ . . . It was anything but an intelligence document. It was, as some people characterized it later, sort of a Chinese menu from which you could pick and choose. (Wilkerson 2005)
Added Wilkerson, “There was no way the Secretary of State was going to read off a script about serious matters of intelligence that could lead to war when the script was basically un-sourced.” He lamented his affiliation with the process by saying: “I wish I had not been involved in it…I look back on it, and I still say it was the lowest point in my life (Wilkerson 2005).

Clearly ashamed of his participation in this duplicity, Wilkerson admitted in a 2010 MSNBC interview that there was no question that he and Powell were pushed into a certain direction when it came to formulating conclusions about the Iraq intelligence. On this point he did not parse his words. He stated:

Well, I actually participated in one of the biggest and most dramatic and most public lies, and that was the presentation at the United Nations by my boss. I participated in the intelligence that got together at Langley, at the CIA, and brought together all of the different entities of our intelligence community, and put it before the American people, before the international community, and before the UN Security Council. And we lied. Now, I’m not standing here, sitting here, telling you that we lied knowing we were lying. But the intelligence community and the political operators worked together in a colossal form of groupthink, in my view, because they all thought it doesn’t matter what we say here; the details are irrelevant because when we invade, we’re going to find weapons of mass destruction. And therefore, we’ll all be exonerated. Well, they didn’t find any weapons of mass destruction. And someone should have began asking those questions earlier than they did, consulting the wider array of intelligence that existed, listening to other people than just the consensus builders, and we would have come out with a very different situation. And I agree with Mr. Rove that Congress might not have approved it. And that’s the reason—and he tells us very clearly that’s the reason, as the Downing Street Memo said, they had to fix the intelligence around the policy. (Wilkerson 2010)

Operation Iraqi Freedom

So in March of 2003, the United States military and “the coalition of the willing” swept into Iraq with the stated intent to find and destroy Saddam Hussein’s WMD capability (Knirck 2007). Early on, the war went well for the U.S. military. In a
matter of a few weeks U.S. and coalition forces swept across the desert and took military control of all the major Iraqi cities including the capital city of Baghdad. Unfortunately the war planners, namely Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, decided to mount the assault on Iraq with just over 150,000 troops, well below the 350,000-500,000 troops recommended by many of the general staff. By doing the war “on the cheap” and rushing to Baghdad, many critical sites in Iraq were passed over and left unsecured. These sites included weapons caches of artillery shells, high explosives, and mortars. Many of these weapons fell into the hands of the insurgents in Iraq and are being used against the occupying American forces even today. This is just one example of the poor planning and lack of foresight that was displayed by the neo-con brain trust regarding the execution of the war and especially the post-war occupation and reestablishment of the Iraqi government (Knirck 2007). By all accounts, the Iraqi people are worse off today than they were under Saddam’s rule. Following a forum on post-Saddam life in Iraq, U.S. Representative Lynn Woolsey issued a statement that included accounts of some of the Iraqi civilians who took part in the forum:

Dahlia Wasfi, a doctor who is half-Jewish and half-Iraqi, offered a powerful historical analogy. She spoke of her mother's relatives being driven from their native Austria to avoid Nazi concentration camps. 'Never again' is the refrain we use when talking about the Holocaust. "She then spoke of her father's relatives, who are, quote, 'not living, but dying, under the occupation of this administration's deadly foray in Iraq.' She went on: 'From the lack of security to the lack of basic supplies, to the lack of electricity to the lack of potable water to the lack of jobs to the lack of reconstruction to the lack of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,

5 In his 2002 testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, then Army Chief of Staff General Erik Shinseki described the necessary manpower for an Iraq invasion force to be “something in the neighborhood of several hundred thousand soldiers.” This recommendation was rejected by Deputy Secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz as being “wildly off the mark.” (Source: Boot, Max. 2006. War made new: Technology, warfare, and the course of history: 1500 to today. Los Angeles, CA: Gotham Press.)
they are worse off now than before we invaded. 'Never again' should apply to them, too. (Woolsey 2006)

Woolsey continued by saying:

An Iraqi civil engineer named Faiza Al-Araji also spoke to us. She fled occupied Iraq last summer after her son, a student, was detained for several days by the Ministry of the Interior without any charges being filed. 'He has a beard, so he was a suspected terrorist!' is the way she put it. Although they said he had committed no crimes, his family had to pay thousands of dollars to secure his release. How's that for the transformational power of freedom? Now she and her family are living as exiles in Jordan, driven away from everything that was once familiar to them. But the only other choice was to live in a country whose infrastructure has been completely torn down but never rebuilt. (Woolsey 2006)

Representative Woolsey added: “Mr. Speaker, in the name of these three brave souls ... for the sake of human decency if nothing else ... it is time to end this war, bring our troops home, and give Iraq back to the Iraqi people” (Woolsey 2006).

Not having found Hussein’s WMD, the Bush Administration then reformulated its motivation for the Iraq invasion as regime change to free the Iraqi people from the dictatorial reign of Saddam Hussein. By the end of the Bush administration, more than 4,400 American service people had lost their lives in Iraq and more than 32,000 have sustained serious injuries, in addition to estimates of Iraqi civilian and military casualties that range from 150,000 to 1,000,000.

Putting aside the poor pre-war and post-war planning that turned George Bush’s foray in Iraq into a colossal military and political failure, one must examine what the neocon’s war has done to undermine the respect and credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world.
Dissent of the Iraq War at Home

Since the run-up to the war in Iraq, there has been much disagreement and dissent from the American people and their political representatives about the reasons for the war and its execution (Knirck 2007). George W. Bush ran for president in 2000 as a “uniter, not a divider.” But the symbol of his neocon agenda, the war in Iraq, has done more to divide Americans than anything since the equally controversial war in Vietnam four decades earlier. On Saturday, April 29, 2006 Cindy Sheehan, fellow activists Susan Sarandon, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and approximately 350,000 protesters marched through New York from Union Square to rally in Foley Square, all united in their quest to end the war (Butler 2006). This rally, which is estimated to be the largest anti-war protest in American history, included veterans groups, labor unions, women’s rights groups, environmental advocacy groups, and many others, all coming together for their single cause. Peace rallies like this one are reminiscent of those during the Viet Nam era. And the similarities of these two unpopular and divisive wars are striking (Knirck 2007).

Even though Senator John Kerry ran unsuccessfully against Bush in the 2004 presidential election as an anti-war candidate who himself had served in Vietnam, Senator Kerry has continued to fight for that cause. In an op-ed piece for the Boston Globe, Senator Kerry made the comparison to the wars and his concern that the war in Iraq will, like Vietnam, divide and weaken the U.S.:

Thirty-five years ago today, I testified before the United States Senate. I was a 27-year-old Vietnam veteran who believed the war had to come to an end. It was 1971. Three years earlier, Richard Nixon had been elected president with a secret plan for peace - a plan he kept secret from the American people as young Americans continued to die for a mission high-ranking officials of two administrations had decided was unwinnable. We would watch the Nixon administration lie, break the law, and work overtime to squash dissent - all the while claiming absurdly they
were prolonging war to protect our troops as they withdrew. We were a country deeply divided. World War II fathers split with Vietnam generation sons over a war that was tearing us apart - and split, particularly, over our responsibilities during a time of war. Many people did not understand or agree with my act of public dissent. To them, supporting the troops meant continuing to support the war, or at least keeping my mouth shut. But I couldn't remain silent. I felt compelled to speak out about what was happening in Vietnam, where the children of America were pulled from front porches and living rooms and plunged almost overnight into a world of sniper fire, ambushes, rockets, booby traps, body bags, explosions, sleeplessness, and the confusion created by an enemy who was sometimes invisible and firing at us, and sometimes right next to us and smiling. It was clear that thousands of Americans were losing their lives in Vietnam while politicians in Washington schemed to save their political reputations. Thirty-five years later, in another war gone off course, I see history repeating itself. It is both a right and an obligation for Americans today to disagree with a president who is wrong, a policy that is wrong, and a course in Iraq that weakens the nation. Again, we must refuse to sit quietly and watch our troops sacrificed for a policy that isn't working while Americans who dissent and ask tough questions are branded unpatriotic. (Kerry 2006)

The war in Vietnam was a tremendous diversion from President Lyndon Johnson’s efforts to build “the Great Society” in the 1960s. His dream to end poverty and educate the poor was stifled politically and fiscally by the war. With job approval ratings hovering between 30 and 40 percent, Johnson lost much of the political capital he needed to implement his programs (Knirck 2007). Real capital was also being siphoned off to pay for the war. Much like Johnson and his progressive agenda, George Bush, mired by dismal approval ratings, left the presidency as an example of how not to implement foreign policy.

The Enduring U.S. Presence in Iraq

One of the major concerns of the people of America and the world is the specter of a continuing and permanent American military presence in Iraq (Knirck 2007). Part of the PNAC/neoconservative strategy for continued American control of Middle Eastern oil and shipping is the projection of power from forward military bases in the
region. The plans for the expansion of the existing bases and the intent to build new bases in Iraq are details that the Bush Administration was not eager to divulge. The Administration often used semantic distinctions to disguise their plans. While not referring to the bases as “permanent,” they instead used the term “enduring” to skirt the issue. Although they may try their best to conceal these plans, the paper trail, more specifically the money trail, gave the United States Congress cause for concern.

Appropriations bills were introduced in the Congress and President Bush made budgetary requests for ten of billions of dollars in “emergency” spending for the Iraq theater. In March of 2006, the House of Representatives passed a $67.6 billion military spending bill and the Bush Administration requested an additional $348 million for base construction. Of the 110 forward-operating bases in the theater, the administration stated that it had turned 34 of them over to the Iraqi military. Due to the obfuscation of the Bush administration and the Pentagon, the exact plans for many of the other bases were not known it was believed that there were approximately 14 bases which the administration was funding in hopes that they would “endure” in Iraq after the current hostilities concluded. These included bases in Balad ($228.7 million spent, $17.8 million requested), Al Asad air base (spending unknown, $46.3 million requested), Camp Taji ($49.6 million in spending, request unknown), and Tallil air base (10.8 million spent, $110.3 million requested) (Der Spiegel 2006).

Besides the possibility of permanent military bases from which the military component of the neoconservative agenda could be projected, a massive United States Embassy was constructed near Baghdad. This not-so-secret project began construction in mid-2005 and opened in January of 2009. The site is on 104 acres and is the largest
embassy in the world. This massive compound, located in the “Green Zone,” is six times the size of the United Nations in New York and nearly ten times the size of the typical American embassy. This self-contained city has its own independent well-water supply, electrical generating station, and wastewater treatment facility. The Marine Corp security detail at the embassy is housed in a hardened facility that is built to 2.5 times the norm. Between the forward military bases and the new American Embassy, there was little doubt as to the intentions for a permanent American presence in Iraq (Knirck 2007).

The Global Reach of the Neoconservative Agenda

The American presence in South-East Asia lasted for more than ten years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the concern of the American anti-communists was the “domino theory.” This held that if Vietnam fell to the communists, the entire region would also fall. In an interesting example of history repeating itself, the PNAC neocons worry about the progressive toppling of Middle Eastern states. By overreaching militarily, the Bush Administration spread the military resources of the U.S. dangerously thin. Simultaneous operations in Afghanistan and Iraq put the U.S. in a precarious position militarily. Should our presence have been needed to cool a hot spot such as Iran, Korea or Taiwan, it was questionable whether the U.S. military could have effectively quelled the situation without resorting to a reinstatement of the selective service.

In 2005, it was disclosed by British intelligence that Iran had successfully enriched a small amount of uranium. Even though most intelligence estimates felt that Iran was more than ten years away from developing a nuclear weapons capability, the Bush administration turned up the rhetoric and not-so-subtly hinted that it would not
hesitate to preemptively strike the Iranian atomic infrastructure (Knirck 2007). There was a great deal of speculation that the use of thermonuclear “bunker-buster” bombs was being considered. The exaggeration by the Bush administration of the Iranian threat was right out of the PNAC/neocon playbook and reminiscent of the Cold War era Team B: exagerate the threat so aggression can be justified. In an April 2006 *Los Angeles Times* op-ed, Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, 1977-1981) indicated that this type of strategy, similar to that used to justify the invasion of Iraq, was counter-productive to global peace and the interests of the United States:

> Even if the United States is not planning an imminent military strike on Iran, persistent hints by official spokesmen that "the military option is on the table" impede the kind of negotiations that could make that option unnecessary. Such threats are likely to unite Iranian nationalists and Shiite fundamentalists because most Iranians are proud of their nuclear program. Military threats also reinforce growing international suspicions that the U.S. might be deliberately encouraging greater Iranian intransigence. Sadly, one has to wonder whether, in fact, such suspicions may not be partly justified. How else to explain the current U.S. "negotiating" stance: refusing to participate in the ongoing negotiations with Iran and insisting on dealing only through proxies. (That stands in sharp contrast with the simultaneous U.S. negotiations with North Korea.) The U.S. is already allocating funds for the destabilization of the Iranian regime and reportedly sending Special Forces teams into Iran to stir up non-Iranian ethnic minorities in order to fragment the Iranian state (in the name of democratization!). And there are clearly people in the Bush administration who do not wish for any negotiated solution, abetted by outside drum-beaters for military action and egged on by full-page ads hyping the Iranian threat. There is unintended irony in a situation in which the outrageous language of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (whose powers are much more limited than his title implies) helps to justify threats by administration figures, which in turn help Ahmadinejad to exploit his intransigence further, gaining more fervent domestic support for him as well as for the Iranian nuclear program. It is therefore high time for the administration to sober up and think strategically, with a historic perspective and the U.S. national interest primarily in mind. It's time to cool the rhetoric. The United States should not be guided by emotions or a sense of a religiously inspired mission. Nor should it lose sight of the fact that deterrence has worked in U.S.-Soviet relations, in U.S.-Chinese relations and in Indo-Pakistani relations. (Brzezinski 2006)
The hyperbole surrounding the Iranian nuclear capability escalated tensions as well as speculation about the ramifications of another American military strike on this not yet threatening Muslim country. Former Clinton and Bush Administration counterterrorism head Richard Clarke agreed with Brzezinski in his concern that an American military incursion into Iran would be devastating to American interests. He said that Iran’s response would most likely be to “use its terrorist network to strike American targets around the world, including inside the United States” (Heinrich 2006, 3).

**Conclusion**

Besides the loss of support domestically, the neocon-driven Bush Administration managed to alienate partners throughout the world. Traditional allies in Europe, which were marginalized by the Bush Administration as being “old Europe” and insignificant, showed reluctance, and in some cases, outright defiance of the United States and its foreign policies under the Bush Administration. Association with George W. Bush proved to be political poison to foreign leaders (Knirck 2007). The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq demonstrated a flagrant disregard for state sovereignty and human rights, things that our allies look to us to support. And in their quest for hegemony, the PNAC neocons gave little consideration to the plight of millions of impoverished and victimized people in areas of the world that were not strategically or economically beneficial to the neoconservative/ PNAC agenda.
CHAPTER VII

PREEMPTION AS A COMPONENT OF
THE BUSH DOCTRINE

Introduction

As Charles Krauthammer declared: “The Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy” (Krauthammer 2005, 22). The basic tenets of neoconservative foreign policy include unilateralism, promoting global free trade, regime change to spread democracy, and the use of preventative or preemptive military strikes to prevent terrorist attacks. The latter is possibly the most relevant facet of neoconservative foreign policy, because if it is misused, the political and military blowback can be far more damaging than the immediate physical threat it was intended to quell. Lawful and justifiable preemption is considered to be a viable option for nations who feel that they are in imminent danger of attack. But this tool must be used properly or not at all. Once broken, it is of no use. The Bush administration failed to adequately justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq on the stated basis of imminent and large-scale danger of nuclear, chemical, or biological terror attacks emanating from Iraq. Without proof of weapons of mass destruction, preemption was not justified, and the tool was broken.
The Specter of a Mushroom Cloud

In the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) (Appendix A), the George W. Bush administration outlined the Bush Doctrine. Prominent in this document is the assertion that new and expanded threats justify the use of preemptive military action by the U.S. to extinguish perceived threats. The NSS uses the terms “preemptive” and “preventative” interchangeably, which is improper. The distinction is very important. Preventative war or military action refers to actions that are designed to disable or destroy a threat that is in its early stages of development, while it is still relatively benign. Preemptive action is intended to destroy a more imminent threat. By acting on the expanded definition of preemption, a country could be seen as violating the Just War Theory (Crawford 2003, 6-25).

The neocons desperately needed to produce the evidence necessary to upgrade the situation in Iraq from preventative to the more urgent scenario that required and justified preemptive action. The neocon brain trust in the administration went on the offensive to convince the American public, and just as importantly, the international community of the importance of preemptive action against Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz used every opportunity to press the idea that the capabilities of the enemy for destruction were so insidious that failure to act aggressively to stop them would be an invitation to annihilate millions of Americans. In appearances on the Sunday political talk shows, conservative radio and television outlets, and in speeches to generally conservative audiences, Condoleezza Rice and others in the administration saturated the media with the rhetoric of doom. One of the more frequently used talking points was, “we can’t let the smoking gun
turn out to be a mushroom cloud.” It was imperative that they make their case for preemption" (Rice 2003).

An important component of the argument for urgency was the technological potential for mass destruction, coupled with the unstable effect of religious fundamentalism. In his June 2002 commencement speech at West Point, President Bush voiced this concern:

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. (Bush 2002a)

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of “a nexus between terrorist networks, terrorist states, and weapons of mass destruction" (Rumsfeld 2002). He added that it is this nexus “that can make mighty adversaries of small or impoverished states and even relatively small groups of individuals” (Rumsfeld 2002). In the 2002 NSS, the Bush administration identified three specific threat agents: weak states that harbor and support terrorist organizations; terrorist organizations that have global reach and rogue states (N.S.S. 2002).

Changing Strategies

There are two basic approaches to combating and dealing with international terrorism. Following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center by elements of al-Qaida, the Clinton Justice Department handled the investigation and trial of the suspects as criminal matter. Using professional investigators and litigators, the Justice Department successfully captured, tried, convicted, and sentenced those individuals who were
involved in the bombing. The law enforcement strategy requires patience and a strict adherence to the rule of law. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the military wing of the neocons in the Bush administration, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Perle, and Wolfowitz overrode the more deliberative and diplomatic members of the administration, especially Secretary of State Colin Powell, and opted for the more reactionary and dramatic approach to terrorism... military might. This approach required much less patience and skill, but was better suited to the aggressive militarism that is characteristic of the neoconservative movement. Blowing up buildings with guided missiles is much more consistent with the neocon image of strength, as opposed to the more cerebral, but less dramatic avenue of diplomacy and law enforcement. In his West Point address, President Bush reaffirmed the tenets of the 2002 National Security Strategy and stated his belief that the military was to be at the forefront of the “war on terror”:

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long—Our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. (Bush 2002b)

Clearly the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed the threat dynamics facing the United States and the strategies for protecting the American people from aggression. During the Cold War, the Soviets were risk averse, so a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction worked to contain the Soviet threat. But, as stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy: “The threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the
wealth of their nations" (N.S.S. 2002). The Bush administration and the neoconservatives, through the NSS, were rejecting the modern effectiveness of Reagan era Cold War Realpolitik. The 2002 N.S.S. continued to define the neoconservative foreign policy of preemption by saying:

This new reality compels us to action...we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. We cannot let our enemies strike first. (National Security Strategy of the United States of America (N.S.S.) 2002)

Precedents of Preemption

In their attempt to make their case for preemption, many promoters of this neoconservative military policy used the comparison of Saddam Hussein and Adolph Hitler’s Germany. This is a poor comparison. Hitler’s “Final Solution” was documented and planned out in Mein Kampf. His campaign for aggression was well-known, and the growing military capability of the Third Reich was a serious concern to Europe. Saddam Hussein was a secularist dictator who was not aligned with fundamentalist Islamic terror organizations. Additionally, the Iraqi military had been decimated by U.N. weapons inspections, and costly wars with Iran and with the coalition following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Dershowitz 2006, 154).

But the Hitler/Germany reference does bring up an interesting point regarding the precedents of preemption and the moral justification through hindsight of those actions. Professor Alan Dershowitz examined a hypothetical use of military preemption set in early 1930s Europe. What if the United States or Great Britain had attacked German military targets before their aggression towards Poland and their designs on
European conquest had come to fruition? Would the U.S or Great Britain have been seen as an unprovoked aggressor even though in retrospect we could see preemptive action as saving millions of lives during World War II? This creates the paradox of prevention: “When it is employed successfully, we rarely can be sure what it prevented. When it is not employed, it is difficult to assess if it could actually have prevented the horrors that did occur” (Dershowitz 2006, 159).

By examining the precedents of preemption, its functional definition and its appropriate use, or non use, can be discerned. There have been several recent instances where preemptive action was considered or applied by the U.S. and by foreign nations. Israel, because it is geographically, ethnically, and politically surrounded by its sworn enemies, has been on the edge of imminent danger many times in its short history, and the option of preemption is always on the table.

In 1967, when combined Arab military forces were massing on the Israeli border, Israel opted to strike first before the opposing force had fully prepared. The result was a spectacular military victory for the Israel. Their use of preemption was classic, and the justification was valid. They were in imminent danger of attack. Outside of the Arab world, this was seen as a legitimate use of the tactic. Then in 1981, a squadron from the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor that was nearing completion at Osirak. Saddam Hussein had promised to use any nuclear weapon gleaned from that research facility on Israel. This may have simply been anti-Israeli banter to curry favor with his Arab neighbors, but the Israelis took the threat very seriously. Similar to the neocon rhetoric surrounding the invasion of Iraq, this situation had the added element of
scale. The added prospect of nuclear or chemical mass destruction was used to push the situation from prevention to preemption.

The tool of preemption has been at the disposal of American presidents long before George W. Bush decided to use it in Iraq. In 1997, it was learned that Libya was building an underground chemical plant at Tarhunah. The National Security Counsel advised President Clinton that a preemptive military action on the site would be an appropriate option. However, concerns for chemical leakage from such a strike, as well as political ramifications convinced the Clinton administration to opt for a diplomatic solution and economic sanctions. Libya complied with the non-military coercion. In the case of Iraq, President Bush did not display the same level of patience or complex reasoning (Capello et al. 1996, v.).

Breaking the Tool

Following the U.S. invasion, occupation, and inspection of Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction were found, nor any credible link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. With the specter of imminent danger discredited, the American and international press began to assail Bush and the neocons over the apparent false pretenses of the war. The misuse of preemption led many columnists, critics, and analysts to declare the death of preemption. An article in the Financial Times declared, “...for all Bush’s bravado, the preemption doctrine is dead,” and “America’s right to preemptive action ‘before threats materialize’ had a hollow as a hubristic ring” (Stevens 2004, 17). In “Shooting First: The Preemptive War Doctrine Has Met an Early Death in Iraq,” columnists James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder declared that the Iraq War makes it “...highly unlikely that preemption is
a tactic that he [Bush] will employ elsewhere any time soon” (Lindsay and Daalder 2004). Adding: “Bush’s doctrine of preemption is, for all intents and purposes, dead (Lindsay and Daalder 2004).” In the New York Times under the headline of "Preventative War: A Failed Doctrine," it was stated that Iraq was the “one real test,” and the George W. Bush and the United States failed miserably. And added: “The real lesson is that America dangerously erodes its military and diplomatic defenses when it charges off unwisely after hypothetical enemies (New York Times 2004).”

Conclusion

Acts of preemption must be seen by the rest of the world as a necessary and justified action. If the justifications are proven to be invalid, the use of preemption as a viable future option is essentially lost. The burden of proof is on the aggressor (preempting) nation, and the standard of proof is high. The evidence of imminent danger does not need to be unequivocal, but it must be compelling and believable by the vast majority of people. In failing to do so, the aggressor nation could be seen in the eyes of the world as a rogue state. The loss of soft power could take decades to regain.

If there is a positive outcome from the misuse of preemption in Iraq, it is that the next time an American president considers this option, there will most likely be a great deal more deliberation involved in the decision, and the action will have the blessing of the international community.
CHAPTER VIII

THE WORLD’S REACTION TO NEOCONSERVATIVE POLICIES AND PRACTICES

Introduction

In a previous chapter of this thesis it was posited that the application of the Bush Doctrine damaged the reputation, and therefore the effectiveness of American foreign policy. The following chapter examines international public opinion during, and following, the George W. Bush administration. Clearly a distinct anti-Bush tendency can be seen in the results. This data shows a gradual trend over several years, possibly indicating a cumulative effect of Bush administration policy on the public opinion.

Post-Cold War Anti-Americanism

International opinion polls that were taken following the U.S. invasion of Iraq indicated a rapid increase in anti-Americanism from 2003 to 2009 (Pew Research Center 2011). But America has had trouble with anti-Americanism throughout its history. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was left as the sole global super power. With this mantle came a need to quell long-existing and ever-increasing distrust of the power and policies of the United States. Concern about American
“hyper-power” was spreading throughout the world. Domestic issues like America's support for capital punishment are deeply offensive to much of the world. The Clinton administration’s rejection of the international land-mine treaty was seen as just another example of American hypocrisy and unilateralism. In 2000, President Clinton established the International Public Relations Group. The goal of this group was to promote goodwill toward American policy by counteracting the negative and often inaccurate portrayal of American foreign and domestic policy. The Bush administration followed up with the establishment of a similar group known as the White House Office of Global Communications (Gedmin and Kennedy 2003). The status of America as the lone superpower places it under the microscope of international public opinion. For this reason, the U.S. is constantly under scrutiny for its actions and inactions, and its fight for the “battlefield of ideas" (Blinken 2002, 101-114).

History of Anti-Americanism: The French Model

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the world in general exhibited a great outpouring of sympathy towards America. In some cases, this goodwill was short-lived. Within a few months, U.S. and coalition troops were in Afghanistan attempting to overthrow the Taliban-ruled government. Shortly thereafter, there was serious talk about an American invasion of Iraq to rid the Hussein government of its weapons of mass destruction. International support for this mission was tepid, and several European allies were vehemently against the prospect of war in Iraq. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s praise for the “coalition of the willing” was in fact an underhanded insult to those countries who were not offering military support in Iraq. The
most notable of these dissenters was France who opposed the prospect of regime change in Iraq.

Political and social reaction to France’s dismissal of the Bush Doctrine was encouraged by the right-wing media and many conservative politicians and pundits. In a show of patriotic grandstanding, Representative Walter Jones (R-North Carolina) and Robert Ney (R-Ohio) insisted that the capitol cafeteria should rename “French fries” as “freedom fries” and “French toast” to “freedom toast” (Loughlin 2003). The cafeteria complied with his insistence. Other similarly meaningless displays of patriotism were encouraged by right-wing radio hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and Bill O’Reilly. These included pouring out bottles of French wine and boycotting all things made in or imported from France. The backlash from these anti-French displays only served to further undermine post 9/11 sympathy for America and rekindle anti-American sentiment in France. Used as an example, the historical modes of French anti-Americanism may be useful in understanding the causes and types of anti-American sentiments that can be generated by the actions of the U.S. government, its people, and its media as well as the motivations for such feelings.

Anti-Americanism is nothing new to France. Meunier (2005) describes the long history of French anti-Americanism and broke down the reasons for this dislike into seven distinct subsets.

“Souverainisme” is the deep seated feeling of national pride and the belief that France should be in a position of global prominence (as it once was). The fact that the United States has displayed a tendency to minimize the contributions and importance of France has left a strong feeling of resentment toward America.
“Legacy anti-Americanism” is derived from the collective animosity that has built up over the years. The American ego-centrist view of the world has fueled much of this long-lasting resentment. Of particular note is the ill will created by U.S. actions and policies during the Cold War in its effort to counter the threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Many French people (and many Europeans) were particularly distressed by the American missiles and military bases that were placed in Europe during the Cold War.

“Liberal anti-Americanism” is derived from the feeling many French have that America is hypocritical and not living up to its ideals. Many French dislike the fact that America acts militarily to remove some dictators, but often does not act against those who have economic ties to the United States. Which is an ironic sentiment from a country with a long history of economic colonialism. This causes much distrust in American policy. The United States also preaches environmentalism, but has often and recently acted to protect industry at the expense of the environment (Kyoto Agreement). It promotes free trade yet imposes tariffs on foreign countries in an effort to maximize American profits.

The fourth major type of French anti-Americanism that Meunier cites is “Elitist anti-Americanism.” Despite the fact that much of the French populace has embraced the Americanization of their culture, the elite traditionalists are dismayed by the rampant corporatism and blatant commercialism that has infiltrated French culture. McDonalds and Coca-Cola have permeated much of France, and the elites strongly resent it as being cheap and classless.

Closely related to legacy anti-Americanism is “Nostalgic anti-Americanism” in which traditionalists long for the days when France was revered as a nation of culture,
and French was considered the language of diplomacy. Many French blame the U.S. for the decline of their culture and the replacement of French with English as the accepted language of internationalism.

“Social anti-Americanism” is one of the most prevalent forms of anti-American sentiment, not only in France but throughout the world. The United States is undeniably more conservative than much of Europe. Resentment for this lack of liberal freedom and compassion is strong and growing. The French see America as horribly unequal in its treatment of the wealthy and the poor. Universal health care, substantial public schooling (including college), and a strong social welfare system are considered to be essential in France and other liberal countries, but they are lacking in the United States. America is also seen as a very violent country with murder rates and incarceration rates many times the French or European averages. This coupled with the frequent use of capital punishment in the U.S. appear to be hypocritical. But the extreme religiosity of America is probably the single most confusing and appalling trait to the French. Religion and politics are strictly separated and this separation is revered.

The seventh form of French anti-Americanism is “Radical Muslim anti-Americanism.” In the last several decades, France has seen a large influx of Muslims from North Africa. They are criticized by the French for their lack of assimilation into French culture. And they have brought with them an anti-American zealotry that is based primarily on the close ties between Israel and America (Meunier 2005, 127-141). Taken as an example of the reasons and types of anti-Americanism, national and regional variations of the French anti-American models can be seen throughout the world.
Recent Trends Toward Anti-American Sentiment

The statistical evidence clearly indicates an increase in the unfavorability of America during the neoconservative George W. Bush Administration. Unfortunately, most international opinion polls regarding the image of America throughout the world are taken on a yearly basis. These results would only yield opinion changes as gradual trends. These analyses of ongoing policies and events give a clear indication of trends, but not public opinion reaction to specific sensational events. Even before the United States entered the war in Iraq, U.S. neoconservative foreign policy under President Bush tended to undermine America’s status with the rest of the world and diminish the effectiveness of its soft power. Even strong and traditional allies were estranged by the go-it-alone policies of the Bush administration. Shortly after his inauguration in January of 2001, George W. Bush implemented one of his many controversial and polarizing foreign policy positions by opting out of the Kyoto Protocol that would limit the emission of greenhouse gasses. This decision was followed shortly thereafter by the Bush Administration’s decision to opt out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the international agreement on small arms trafficking. These policies led to a steep decline in international good will and cooperation between the U.S. and some of its most valued and reliable allies such as Canada, France, Germany, and Spain (Richter 2005, 1-19).

There are several highly regarded international opinion polls that ask questions about the pro-American or anti-American sentiment in various countries throughout the world. These polls can be utilized to establish and analyze public opinion
with regards to the neoconservative foreign policies of the Bush administration. Although identical question surveys would be ideal, general survey questions that glean responses to general questions about pro-American or anti-American sentiment will yield data that is suitable for analyzing broad trends of approval or disapproval of American foreign policy. The following public opinion data was acquired from Pew Global Attitudes, and it is an example of the type of general attitudes polling that would be used in the general trends element of this thesis. Respondents were asked about their: 1) Confidence in the U.S. President (table 1); Favorable or unfavorable view of the United States (table 2); And favorable or unfavorable view of the American people (table 3). The data sets include opinions from 2002 through 2010. This span gives an indication of the positive or negative trends from the early Bush Administration and the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, through the change to the Barack Obama Administration in 2009. By focusing on the change between the 2008 and 2009 columns, which marks the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration, a distinct global trend is evident. Regarding all three poll questions, with few exceptions, international and U.S. respondents indicated a marked change from their attitudes regarding the American president, Americans, and U.S. policies during a neoconservative administration, and one viewed as apparently progressive.

Confidence in the President of the United States

Table 1 indicates individuals who responded that they had "confidence" in the President of the United States. All countries (with complete data) showed a distinct increase in confidence between George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Large countries
Table 1. Public Opinion Data Regarding Confidence in the U.S. Presidents Bush and Obama. Opinion Poll: “How much confidence do you have in the U.S. President?”

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with traditionally strong alliances with the U.S. were consistent with the trend. Great Britain indicated a confidence level of 51 percent in 2003, which declined throughout the Bush years with a low of 16 percent in 2008. This was followed in 2009 by a confidence score of 86 percent in the first year of the Obama administration. Similar trends can be seen in the data from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Spain, and the United States. All indicated declining confidence numbers for George W. Bush from 2003 to 2008 and significantly increased confidence in Barack Obama. In some cases, the
contrasts between 2008 and 2009 were remarkable in their scale. Included with Great Britain in showing a monumental increase in the transitional year between the two presidents, France jumped from 13 percent to 91 percent. Similarly in that year, Germany went from 14 percent to 93 percent confidence, Japan went from 25 percent to 85 percent, Mexico from 16 percent to 55 percent, Spain from 8 percent to 72 percent, and Turkey moved from 2 percent confidence to 33 percent.

Opinion of the United States and its People

Taken on its own, the data in table 1 paints an incomplete picture of world opinion regarding the president, his policies, or the United States in general, as studied as a contrast between a neoconservative administration and a progressive administration. To add depth to the examination, the data in table 2 and table 3 indicate a percentage of individuals who responded "favorable" when asked about the United States, and the American people, respectively.

The data in table 2, which indicates the strength of favorable views toward the United States as a whole, is consistent with the downward trend of President Bush's favorability during the term of his administration, followed immediately by a sharp rebound in presidential favorability coinciding with the beginning of the Obama Administration. The poll results for traditional American allies are shown to be quite similar. Between 2002 (the first year available for this question in table 2) and 2008, favorability for the United States fell in Great Britain by 23 percentage points, from 75 percent in 2002 to 53 percent in 2008. This was followed in 2009 by a 17 percent upswing, associated with the beginning of the Obama Administration. Similarly, in the
Table 2. Public Opinion Data Regarding the Favorability of the United States. 
Opinion Poll: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the U.S.?”

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same time frame, favorability for the U.S. fell in France by 20 percent, followed by a 2009 increase of 33 percent. Germany dropped 29 percent from 2002 to 2008, and rebounded in 2009 by 33 percent.
Whereas the poll results in table 2 indicate the favorability of the United States as a country, the poll result shown in table 3 reflect the favorability that other countries feel for the American people. This poll also indicated a downward trend during the Bush Administration, followed by more positive favorability at the beginning of the Obama Administration. During this period, global opinion toward the American people remained high, compared to opinions about the U.S. as a country, and very high in relation to opinion about the president. Approval in Great Britain dropped from 82 percent in 2002 to 70 percent in 2008, with a predictable increase of 3 percent in 2009. Approval ratings for France went from 71 percent in 2002 to 64 percent in 2008, followed by an 11 percent increase in 2009. German approval numbers went from 70 percent in 2002 down to 55 percent in 2008, with an increase of 9 percent in 2009.

Table 3. Public Opinion Data Regarding the Favorability of the People of the United States. Opinion Poll: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the American people?

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Conclusion

Analysis of the data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project shows that although global opinion regarding America, Americans, and the American president tended to decline during the Bush administration and rebound at the beginning of the Obama administration, favorability for the United States and its citizens remained relatively high, indicating members of the global community recognize a distinction between the president and the people whom he governs.

As discussed in this chapter, there are many reasons for global citizens to develop anti-American sentiments and opinions. The polling data cited indicates a distinct and consistent unfavorability trend during the neoconservative George W. Bush administration. These lowered levels of international approval could very well serve to undermine and diminish U.S. soft power.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Neoconservative History

Although some of its basic tenets date back to the Truman Doctrine, the modern incarnation of neoconservative foreign policy has morphed well beyond Truman's concern about the growing Soviet threat to U.S. global supremacy. Following the collapse of the Soviet threat in the late Twentieth Century, alarm over the possibility that the Twenty-first century might not be dominated by the United States, neoconservative beliefs and policies found a vehicle in the George W. Bush Administration. By undermining U.S. credibility, popularity, and respect within the international community, these policies impaired American soft power and the ability to win hearts and minds. The neoconservative use of poorly justified unilateral and preemptive military action reduced the possibility of such practices in the future, thereby limiting the military options of the Commander in Chief. Characterized by a world view that nations and philosophies are either good or evil, a related us-versus-them mentality, a disdain for diplomacy and multilateral organizations, an eagerness to use military force unilaterally, if deemed necessary, and a focus on the Middle East, the Bush Doctrine emerged as the means by which the Twenty-first century would be the new American century. Many of the justifications for these policies and beliefs were rooted in the philosophy of American exceptionalism. The Bush administration, and the neocons who
controlled the development and implementation of its foreign policy, relied heavily on the belief that America, through its moral clarity and superiority, was uniquely qualified to operate as a benevolent hegemon and dictate the means by which the global community should extend Western democracy. And the use of regime change to execute their agenda was acceptable and apparently enthusiastically embraced by the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party and the Bush administration.

The Iraq War and its Moral Consequences

With military might as the primary mode of implementation of the Bush Doctrine, the neocon members of the administration borrowed from the playbook of Cold War era presidents and manipulated military intelligence data to convince congress and the American people that the threat to U.S. security was far greater than it actually was. Players from the Cold War Team B, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Dick Cheney, reconstituted the team and the program to overestimate the peril that Iraq posed to world security. Much as the original Team B manipulated the intelligence to artificially create "missile gaps" and "bomber gaps" between the American and Soviet militaries, the Bush Administration's Office of Special Plans manipulated the intelligence to create the perception of an imminent threat from a nonexistent Iraqi WMD program.

A poorly planned and undermanned invasion of Iraq, coupled with an equally faulty strategy of rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq in the aftermath of the war, contributed greatly to the disdain for the U.S. Commander in Chief and his foreign policy advisors. Unrestrained and virtually unpunished violence perpetrated by American private military contractors served to create the perception of a lawless American occupation of a
sovereign state. The moral righteousness that fertilized the ethos of American
exceptionalism in the Bush Administration was dramatically undercut by revelations that
acts of torture and degradation on detainees under the supervision of American soldiers
and private military contractors were rampant at prisons and holding facilities within
Iraq, at Guantanamo Bay, and in secret sites throughout the world. The disclosure of
official Administration authorizations and approvals for these acts further diminished the
moral and legal standing of the United States in the eyes of the global community.

Acting on Bad Intelligence

Using the specter of a WMD-capable Iraq, and a rogue Saddam Hussein intent
on attacking the U.S. and her allies, the Bush Administration neocons, only partially
deterred by the insistence of the United Nations to continue economic sanctions on Iraq
and inspections of its possible WMD facilities, pressed forward with their plans to invade
Iraq. Using carefully selected bits of intelligence gleaned from dubious and unreliable
sources, the administration sent a reluctant and skeptical Colin Powell to the U.N. on
February 5th 2003, to plead their case for military action to the world. The only dove in
the upper echelon of the president's foreign policy team, Secretary of State Powell,
presented what the president's advisors assured him was accurate, actionable intelligence
of the existence of Iraqi WMD. Following the invasion of Iraq, and inspections of
suspected weapons sites, the information that Colin Powell had submitted to the U.N. and
the world was discredited, along with the administration's primary justification for
invading a sovereign country and causing possibly hundreds of thousands of civilian
casualties. The neocon's case for preemptive and largely unilateral military action was
destroyed. The Administration's unjustified and poorly executed foray into preemptive war will likely render that possible military strategy useless for future presidents. However, from an optimistic viewpoint, as a result of the failure of the Bush administration to correctly utilize this tool, future presidents will be compelled to present the world with substantial and irrefutable evidence and justification for such an action. And based on sound evidence, future preemptive actions will be able to garner substantial support from the international community.

Public Opinion

Under the Bush Doctrine, the Administration preferred unilateral action to multilateral action coordinated by international organizations, belittlement of traditional allies, enthusiastic and unwarranted military aggression toward Middle Eastern nations, and a Christian-based religious zealotry that, combined with the aforementioned tendencies, gave the impression that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the Twenty-first Century version of the Crusades. The fear and alienation that these policies and actions fomented can be, to a certain extent, quantified by public opinion polls. In chapter seven of this thesis, an analysis of Pew Global Attitudes polls revealed a significant and consistent decline in public opinion of the United States, the American people, and to a much greater degree, the American president from 2003 through 2009.

Post-Bush Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

On October 9th, 2009, less than a year after his inauguration, President Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In reading the text and subtext of the Nobel Committee's announcement, it was apparent that he was given this prize not only for his
efforts to strengthen diplomatic ties, but in his effort to undo George W. Bush's neoconservative foreign policy. The Nobel Committee, an obviously left-leaning organization, apparently awarded President Obama the prize for not being George W. Bush. The full text of the Nobel Award ceremony speech by the Chairman of the Nobel Committee, Thorbjorn Jagland, can be read in appendix H. The announcement of the prize by the committee read as follows:

The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009.
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 is to be awarded to President Barack Obama for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples. The Committee has attached special importance to Obama's vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons. Obama has as President created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations.

Thanks to Obama's initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened. Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population. For 108 years, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has sought to stimulate precisely that international policy and those attitudes for which Obama is now the world's leading spokesman. The Committee endorses Obama's appeal that "Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges.

Oslo, October 9, 2009. (Nobel Committee. 2009)

As only the third sitting U.S. president to be given this prestigious award, President Obama joins Theodore Roosevelt, who received the award in 1906, followed by Woodrow Wilson in 1919. President Obama responded to the award with humility, and the affirmation that he would continue to work towards facing the challenges that the
world collectively faces in the Twenty-first Century by addressing the press corps in the

Whitehouse Rose Garden:

Good morning. Well, this is not how I expected to wake up this morning. After I received the news, Malia walked in and said, "Daddy, you won the Nobel Peace Prize, and it is Bo's birthday!" And then Sasha added, "Plus, we have a three-day weekend coming up." So it's good to have kids to keep things in perspective. I am both surprised and deeply humbled by the decision of the Nobel Committee. Let me be clear: I do not view it as a recognition of my own accomplishments, but rather as an affirmation of American leadership on behalf of aspirations held by people in all nations. To be honest, I do not feel that I deserve to be in the company of so many of the transformative figures who've been honored by this prize -- men and women who've inspired me and inspired the entire world through their courageous pursuit of peace. But I also know that this prize reflects the kind of world that those men and women, and all Americans, want to build -- a world that gives life to the promise of our founding documents. And I know that throughout history, the Nobel Peace Prize has not just been used to honor specific achievement; it's also been used as a means to give momentum to a set of causes. And that is why I will accept this award as a call to action -- a call for all nations to confront the common challenges of the 21st century. These challenges can't be met by any one leader or any one nation. And that's why my administration has worked to establish a new era of engagement in which all nations must take responsibility for the world we seek. We cannot tolerate a world in which nuclear weapons spread to more nations and in which the terror of a nuclear holocaust endangers more people. And that's why we've begun to take concrete steps to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, because all nations have the right to pursue peaceful nuclear power, but all nations have the responsibility to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. We cannot accept the growing threat posed by climate change, which could forever damage the world that we pass on to our children -- sowing conflict and famine; destroying coastlines and emptying cities. And that's why all nations must now accept their share of responsibility for transforming the way that we use energy. We can't allow the differences between peoples to define the way that we see one another, and that's why we must pursue a new beginning among people of different faiths and races and religions; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect. And we must all do our part to resolve those conflicts that have caused so much pain and hardship over so many years, and that effort must include an unwavering commitment that finally realizes that the rights of all Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and security in nations of their own.

We can't accept a world in which more people are denied opportunity and dignity that all people yearn for -- the ability to get an education and make
a decent living; the security that you won't have to live in fear of disease or violence without hope for the future. And even as we strive to seek a world in which conflicts are resolved peacefully and prosperity is widely shared, we have to confront the world as we know it today. I am the Commander-in-Chief of a country that's responsible for ending a war and working in another theater to confront a ruthless adversary that directly threatens the American people and our allies. I'm also aware that we are dealing with the impact of a global economic crisis that has left millions of Americans looking for work. These are concerns that I confront every day on behalf of the American people. Some of the work confronting us will not be completed during my presidency. Some, like the elimination of nuclear weapons, may not be completed in my lifetime. But I know these challenges can be met so long as it's recognized that they will not be met by one person or one nation alone. This award is not simply about the efforts of my administration -- it's about the courageous efforts of people around the world. And that's why this award must be shared with everyone who strives for justice and dignity -- for the young woman who marches silently in the streets on behalf of her right to be heard even in the face of beatings and bullets; for the leader imprisoned in her own home because she refuses to abandon her commitment to democracy; for the soldier who sacrificed through tour after tour of duty on behalf of someone half a world away; and for all those men and women across the world who sacrifice their safety and their freedom and sometime their lives for the cause of peace. That has always been the cause of America. That's why the world has always looked to America. And that's why I believe America will continue to lead.

Thank you very much. (Obama 2009)

The full text of President Obama's Nobel lecture can be read in Appendix I.

Final Conclusions

The neoconservative movement, the PNAC agenda, and the Bush Administration have become intertwined and synonymous. With the Bush Administration as their executor, the neocons succeeded in undermining their own power and influence by turning the rest of the world against the United States through their policies and actions. Due to its actions related to the war in Iraq, the neoconservative movement did itself a great disservice. Undoubtedly, the neoconservative movement was very hopeful
of their success in 2000 when the first true neocon president was elected (Knirck 2007). President Bush and his administration became the embodiment of the movement. One of the goals of the movement and PNAC was the control, or the attempt to control, of oil in the Middle East, mainly to keep the oil out of the hands of China. Concerning the failures of the war in Iraq and the Bush Administration’s foreign policy blunders regarding the rest of the “Axis of Evil,” conservative columnist George Will said: “Today, with all three components of the "axis of evil

' -- Iraq, Iran, North Korea -- more dangerous than they were when that phrase was coined in 2002, the country would welcome, and Iraq's political class needs to hear, as a glimpse into the abyss, presidential words as realistic as those Britain heard on June 4, 1940. (Will 2006, 2)

In February of 2006, Francis Fukuyama, one of the primary supporters of the neocon/PNAC agenda, stated in no uncertain terms that the movement has proven to be a colossal failure, saying that it has "evolved into something I can no longer support" (Wright 2006). And Fukuyama continued that it is an example of "the danger of good intentions carried to extremes" (Wright 2006). Fukuyama referred to the neocons as Leninists who "...believed that history can be pushed along with the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States" (Wright 2006).

The George W. Bush Administration will go down in history as the first true neoconservative administration…and possibly the last. Staffed with PNAC ideologues, they reached beyond their grasp and succeeded in dividing America and the world and in uniting our enemies against us. The American people and the global community should learn the lesson of the neoconservative’s failed exercise. And if the concept was not
completely disproven, it could be argued that it was at least discredited. Viewing the neoconservative movement and its associated foreign policies as a failed experiment, its greatest value is that of a polemic. The mistakes of the George W. Bush Administration in the area of foreign policy are now well documented. The lasting legacy of this era may be one of positive change through the examination of the failures of these policies. Being only a few years removed from this episode of the American narrative, it is too soon to fully grasp the enduring impact of these events. The long-term analysis of the effects will be determined by political scientists and historians a generation down the road.
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APPENDIX A
I. Overview of America's International Strategy

"Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.

For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality.

That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all. To achieve these goals, the United States will:
champion aspirations for human dignity;
• strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
• work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
• prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
• ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
• expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
• develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
• transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s
strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states’ pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- **Proactive counterproliferation efforts.** We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

- **Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.** We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking
WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.

- **Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.** Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

- In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.
- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.
APPENDIX A REFERENCES


APPENDIX B
EXECUTIVE ORDER
EO 13198
Effective Date: January 29, 2001

Responsible Office: Office of General Counsel

Subject: Agency Responsibilities With Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to help the Federal Government coordinate a national effort to expand opportunities for faith-based and other community organizations and to strengthen their capacity to better meet social needs in America's communities, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment of Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. (a) The Attorney General, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall each establish within their respective departments a Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (Center).

(b) Each executive department Center shall be supervised by a Director, appointed by the department head in consultation with the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (White House OFBCI).

(c) Each department shall provide its Center with appropriate staff, administrative support, and other resources to meet its responsibilities under this order.

(d) Each department's Center shall begin operations no later than 45 days from the date of this order.

Sec. 2. Purpose of Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The purpose of the executive department Centers will be to coordinate department efforts to eliminate regulatory, contracting, and other programmatic obstacles to the participation of faith-based and other community organizations in the provision of social services.
Sec. 3. Responsibilities of Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Each Center shall, to the extent permitted by law: (a) conduct, in coordination with the White House OFBCI, a department-wide audit to identify all existing barriers to the participation of faith-based and other community organizations in the delivery of social services by the department, including but not limited to regulations, rules, orders, procurement, and other internal policies and practices, and outreach activities that either facially discriminate against or otherwise discourage or disadvantage the participation of faith-based and other community organizations in Federal programs; (b) coordinate a comprehensive departmental effort to incorporate faith-based and other community organizations in department programs and initiatives to the greatest extent possible; (c) propose initiatives to remove barriers identified pursuant to section 3(a) of this order, including but not limited to reform of regulations, procurement, and other internal policies and practices, and outreach activities; (d) propose the development of innovative pilot and demonstration programs to increase the participation of faith-based and other community organizations in Federal as well as State and local initiatives; and (e) develop and coordinate department outreach efforts to disseminate information more effectively to faith-based and other community organizations with respect to programming changes, contracting opportunities, and other department initiatives, including but not limited to Web and Internet resources.

Sec. 4. Additional Responsibilities of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Labor Centers. In addition to those responsibilities described in section 3 of this order, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Labor Centers shall, to the extent permitted by law: (a) conduct a comprehensive review of policies and practices affecting existing funding streams governed by so-called “Charitable Choice” legislation to assess the department’s compliance with the requirements of Charitable Choice; and (b) promote and ensure compliance with existing Charitable Choice legislation by the department, as well as its partners in State and local government, and their contractors.

Sec. 5. Reporting Requirements. (a) Report. Not later than 180 days after the date of this order and annually thereafter, each of the five executive department Centers described in section 1 of this order shall prepare and submit a report to the White House OFBCI.
(b) Contents. The report shall include a description of the department’s efforts in carrying out its responsibilities under this order, including but not limited to:

(1) a comprehensive analysis of the barriers to the full participation of faith-based and other community organizations in the delivery of social services identified pursuant to section 3(a) of this order and the proposed strategies to eliminate those barriers; and

(2) a summary of the technical assistance and other information that will be available to faith-based and other community organizations regarding the program activities of the department and the preparation of applications or proposals for grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and procurement.

© Performance Indicators. The first report, filed 180 days after the date of this order, shall include annual performance indicators and measurable objectives for department action. Each report filed thereafter shall measure the department’s performance against the objectives set forth in the initial report.

Sec. 6. Responsibilities of All Executive Departments and Agencies. All executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall: (a) designate an agency employee to serve as the liaison and point of contact with the White House OFBCI; and

(b) cooperate with the White House OFBCI and provide such information, support, and assistance to the White House OFBCI as it may request, to the extent permitted by law.

Sec. 7. Administration and Judicial Review. (a) The agencies’ actions directed by this Executive Order shall be carried out subject to the availability of appropriations and to the extent permitted by law.

(b) This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

/s/George W. Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 29, 2001
APPENDIX B REFERENCE

APPENDIX C
EO 13199
Effective Date: January 29, 2001

Responsible Office: Office of the Administrator
Subject: Establishment of White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives

By the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to help the Federal Government coordinate a national effort to expand opportunities for faith-based and other community organizations and to strengthen their capacity to better meet social needs in America's communities, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. Faith-based and other community organizations are indispensable in meeting the needs of poor Americans and distressed neighborhoods. Government cannot be replaced by such organizations, but it can and should welcome them as partners. The paramount goal is compassionate results, and private and charitable community groups, including religious ones, should have the fullest opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level playing field, so long as they achieve valid public purposes, such as curbing crime, conquering addiction, strengthening families and neighborhoods, and overcoming poverty. This delivery of social services must be results oriented and should value the bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and neutrality.

Sec. 2. Establishment. There is established a White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (White House OFBCI) within the Executive Office of the President that will have lead responsibility in the executive branch to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Federal Government's comprehensive effort to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of faith-based and other community organizations to the extent permitted by law.

Sec. 3. Functions. The principal functions of the White House OFBCI are, to the extent permitted by law: (a) to develop, lead, and coordinate the Administration's policy agenda affecting faith-based and other community programs and initiatives, expand the role of such efforts in communities, and
increase their capacity through executive action, legislation, Federal and private funding, and regulatory relief,

(b) to ensure that Administration and Federal Government policy decisions and programs are consistent with the President's stated goals with respect to faith-based and other community initiatives;

(c) to help integrate the President's policy agenda affecting faith-based and other community organizations across the Federal Government;

(d) to coordinate public education activities designed to mobilize public support for faith-based and community nonprofit initiatives through volunteerism, special projects, demonstration pilots, and public-private partnerships;

(e) to encourage private charitable giving to support faith-based and community initiatives;

(f) to bring concerns, ideas, and policy options to the President for assisting strengthening, and replicating successful faith-based and other community programs;

(g) to provide policy and legal education to State, local, and community policymakers and public officials seeking ways to empower faith-based and other community organizations and to improve the, opportunities, capacity, and expertise of such groups;

(h) to develop and implement strategic initiatives under the President's agenda to strengthen the institutions of civil society and America's families and communities;

(i) to showcase and herald innovative grassroots nonprofit organizations and civic initiatives;

(j) to eliminate unnecessary legislative, regulatory, and other bureaucratic barriers that impede effective faith-based and other community efforts to solve social problems;

(k) to monitor implementation of the President's agenda affecting faith-based and other community organizations; and

(l) to ensure that the efforts of faith-based and other community organizations meet high standards of excellence and accountability.
Sec. 4. Administration. (a) The White House OFBCI may function through established or ad hoc committees, task forces, or interagency groups.

(b) The White House OFBCI shall have a staff to be headed by the Assistant to the President for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The White House OFBCI shall have such staff and other assistance, to the extent permitted by law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order. The White House OFBCI operations shall begin no later than 30 days from the date of this order.

(c) The White House OFBCI shall coordinate with the liaison and point of contact designated by each executive department and agency with respect to this initiative.

(d) All executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall cooperate with the White House OFBCI and provide such information, support, and assistance to the White House OFBCI as it may request, to the extent permitted by law.

(e) The agencies' actions directed by this Executive Order shall be carried out subject to the availability of appropriations and to the extent permitted by law.

Sec. 5. Judicial Review. This order does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

/s/George W. Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 29, 2001
APPENDIX C REFERENCE

By the authority vested in me as President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–366), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. General Determinations. (a) The United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Members of al Qaeda were responsible for the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, and for many other terrorist attacks, including against the United States, its personnel, and its allies throughout the world. These forces continue to fight the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and they continue to plan additional acts of terror throughout the world. On February 7, 2002, I determined for the United States that members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces are unlawful enemy combatants who are not entitled to the protections that the Third Geneva Convention provides to prisoners of war. I hereby reaffirm that determination.

(b) The Military Commissions Act defines certain prohibitions of Common Article 3 for United States law, and it reaffirms and reinforces the authority of the President to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions.

Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

(a) “Common Article 3” means Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

(b) “Geneva Conventions” means:

(i) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);

(ii) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);

(iii) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and

(iv) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).

(c) “Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Sec. 3. Compliance of a Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program with Common Article 3. (a) Pursuant to the authority of the President under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including the Military Commissions Act of 2006, this order interprets the meaning and application of the text of Common Article 3 with respect to certain detentions and interrogations, and shall be treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of United States law, including satisfaction of the international obligations of the United States. I hereby determine that Common Article 3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency as set forth in this section. The requirements set forth in this section shall be applied with respect to detainees in such program without adverse distinction as to their race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth.

(b) I hereby determine that a program of detention and interrogation approved by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency fully complies with the obligations of the United States under Common Article 3, provided that:

(i) the conditions of confinement and interrogation practices of the program do not include:

(A) torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code;
(B) any of the acts prohibited by section 2441(d) of title 18, United States Code, including murder, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, taking of hostages, or performing of biological experiments;
(C) other acts of violence serious enough to be considered comparable to murder, torture, mutilation, and cruel or inhuman treatment, as defined in section 2441(d) of title 18, United States Code;
(D) any other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the Military Commissions Act (subsection 6(c) of Public Law 109–366) and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (section 1003 of Public Law 109–148 and section 1403 of Public Law 109–163);
(E) willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose of humiliating or degrading the individual in a manner so serious that any reasonable person, considering the circumstances, would deem the acts to be beyond the bounds of human decency, such as sexual or sexually indecent acts undertaken for the purpose of humiliation, forcing the individual to perform sexual acts or to pose sexually, threatening the individual with sexual mutilation, or using the individual as a human shield; or
(F) acts intended to denigrate the religion, religious practices, or religious objects of the individual;

(ii) the conditions of confinement and interrogation practices are to be used with an alien detainee who is determined by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency:

(A) to be a member or part of or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated organizations; and
(B) likely to be in possession of information that:

(1) could assist in detecting, mitigating, or preventing terrorist attacks, such as attacks within the United States or against its Armed Forces or other personnel, citizens, or facilities, or against allies or
other countries cooperating in the war on terror with the United States, or their armed forces or other personnel, citizens, or facilities; or
(2) could assist in locating the senior leadership of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces;
(iii) the interrogation practices are determined by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, based upon professional advice, to be safe for use with each detainee with whom they are used; and
(iv) detainees in the program receive the basic necessities of life, including adequate food and water, shelter from the elements, necessary clothing, protection from extremes of heat and cold, and essential medical care.
(c) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall issue written policies to govern the program, including guidelines for Central Intelligence Agency personnel that implement paragraphs (i)(C), (E), and (F) of subsection 3(b) of this order, and including requirements to ensure:

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(i) safe and professional operation of the program;
(ii) the development of an approved plan of interrogation tailored for each detainee in the program to be interrogated, consistent with subsection 3(b)(iv) of this order;
(iii) appropriate training for interrogators and all personnel operating the program;
(iv) effective monitoring of the program, including with respect to medical matters, to ensure the safety of those in the program; and
(v) compliance with applicable law and this order.
Sec. 4. Assignment of Function. With respect to the program addressed in this order, the function of the President under section 6(c)(3) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 is assigned to the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, this order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to prevent or limit reliance upon this order in a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding, or otherwise, by the Central Intelligence Agency or by any individual acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with the program addressed in this order.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
[FR Doc. 07–3656 Filed 7–23–07; 10:16 am]
Billing code 3195–01–P
Executive Order 13491 of January 22, 2009
Ensuring Lawful Interrogations

By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering, to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel who are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. Revocation. Executive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, is revoked. All executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order. Heads of departments and agencies shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all directives, orders, and regulations of their respective departments or agencies are consistent with this order. Upon request, the Attorney General shall provide guidance about which directives, orders, and regulations are inconsistent with this order.

Section 2. Definitions. As used in this order:
(a) ‘‘Army Field Manual 2–22.3’’ means FM 2–22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, issued by the Department of the Army on September 6, 2006.
(b) ‘‘Army Field Manual 34–52’’ means FM 34–52, Intelligence Interrogation, issued by the Department of the Army on May 8, 1987.
(c) ‘‘Common Article 3’’ means Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions.
(e) ‘‘Geneva Conventions’’ means:
(i) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
(ii) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
(iii) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and
(iv) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).
(f) ‘‘Treated humanely,’’ ‘‘violence to life and person,’’ ‘‘murder of all
kinds,""mutilation,""""cruel treatment,""""torture,""""""outrages upon personal dignity,"" and ""humiliating and degrading treatment" refer to, and have the same meaning as, those same terms in Common Article 3.

(g) The terms ""detention facilities"" and ""detention facility"" in section 4(a) of this order do not refer to facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.

Sec. 3. Standards and Practices for Interrogation of Individuals in the Custody or Control of the United States in Armed Conflicts.

(a) Common Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline. Consistent with the requirements of the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), whenever such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States.

(b) Interrogation Techniques and Interrogation-Related Treatment. Effective immediately, an individual in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2–22.3 (Manual). Interrogation techniques, approaches, and treatments described in the Manual shall be implemented strictly in accord with the principles, processes, conditions, and limitations the Manual prescribes. Where processes required by the Manual, such as a requirement of approval by specified Department of Defense officials, are inapposite to a department or an agency other than the Department of Defense, such a department or agency shall use processes that are substantially equivalent to the processes the Manual prescribes for the Department of Defense. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other Federal law enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises.


Sec. 4. Prohibition of Certain Detention Facilities, and Red Cross Access
to Detained Individuals.

(a) CIA Detention. The CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.

(b) International Committee of the Red Cross Access to Detained Individuals.
All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and timely access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.

Sec. 5. Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies.

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(a) Establishment of Special Interagency Task Force. There shall be established a Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies (Special Task Force) to review interrogation and transfer policies.

(b) Membership. The Special Task Force shall consist of the following members, or their designees:
(i) the Attorney General, who shall serve as Chair;
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence, who shall serve as Co-Vice-Chair;
(iii) the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as Co-Vice-Chair;
(iv) the Secretary of State;
(v) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(vi) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(vii) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
(viii) other officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States, as determined by the Chair, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned.

(c) Staff. The Chair may designate officers and employees within the Department of Justice to serve as staff to support the Special Task Force. At the request of the Chair, officers and employees from other departments or agencies may serve on the Special Task Force with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency that employ such individuals. Such staff must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States. The Chair shall designate an officer or employee of the Department of Justice to serve as the Executive Secretary of the Special Task Force.

(d) Operation. The Chair shall convene meetings of the Special Task Force, determine its agenda, and direct its work. The Chair may establish and direct subgroups of the Special Task Force, consisting exclusively of members of the Special Task Force, to deal with particular subjects.

(e) Mission. The mission of the Special Task Force shall be:
(i) to study and evaluate whether the interrogation practices and techniques in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, when employed by departments or agencies outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies; and
(ii) to study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to other nations in order to ensure that such practices comply with the
domestic laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody or control.

(f) **Administration.** The Special Task Force shall be established for administrative purposes within the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, provide administrative support and funding for the Special Task Force.

(g) **Recommendations.** The Special Task Force shall provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Counsel to the President, on the matters set forth in subsection (d) within 180 days of the date of this order, unless the Chair determines that an extension is necessary.

(h) **Termination.** The Chair shall terminate the Special Task Force upon the completion of its duties.

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**Sec. 6. Construction with Other Laws.** Nothing in this order shall be construed to affect the obligations of officers, employees, and other agents of the United States Government to comply with all pertinent laws and treaties of the United States governing detention and interrogation, including but not limited to: the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A; the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 2441; the Federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C. 113; the Federal maiming statute, 18 U.S.C. 114; the Federal “stalking” statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A; articles 93, 124, 128, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 893, 924, 928, and 934; section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd; section 6(c) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109–366; the Geneva Conventions; and the Convention Against Torture. Nothing in this order shall be construed to diminish any rights that any individual may have under these or other laws and treaties. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

*January 22, 2009.*

[FR Doc. E9–1885

Filed 1–26–09; 11:15 am]

Billing code 3195–W9–P
APPENDIX E REFERENCE

Executive Order 13492 of January 22, 2009
Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained At the Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to effect the appropriate disposition of individuals currently detained by the Department of Defense at the Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base (Guanta´namo) and promptly to close detention facilities at Guanta´namo, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. Definitions. As used in this order:
(a) “Common Article 3” means Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions.
(b) “Geneva Conventions” means:
(i) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);
(ii) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217);
(iii) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and
(iv) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).
(c) “Individuals currently detained at Guanta´namo” and “individuals covered by this order” mean individuals currently detained by the Department of Defense in facilities at the Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base whom the Department of Defense has ever determined to be, or treated as, enemy combatants.

Sec. 2. Findings.
(a) Over the past 7 years, approximately 800 individuals whom the Department of Defense has ever determined to be, or treated as, enemy combatants have been detained at Guanta´namo. The Federal Government has moved more than 500 such detainees from Guanta´namo, either by returning them to their home country or by releasing or transferring them to a third country. The Department of Defense has determined that a number of the individuals currently detained at Guanta´namo are eligible for such transfer or release.
(b) Some individuals currently detained at Guanta´namo have been there for more than 6 years, and most have been detained for at least 4 years. In view of the significant concerns raised by these detentions, both within the United States and internationally, prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at Guanta´namo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice. Merely closing the facilities without promptly determining the appropriate disposition of the individuals detained would not adequately serve those interests. To the extent practicable, the prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals detained at Guanta´namo should precede the closure of the detention facilities at Guanta´namo.
The individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Most of those individuals have filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal court challenging the lawfulness of their detention.

It is in the interests of the United States that the executive branch undertake a prompt and thorough review of the factual and legal bases for the continued detention of all individuals currently held at Guantánamo, and of whether their continued detention is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and in the interests of justice. The unusual circumstances associated with detentions at Guantánamo require a comprehensive interagency review.

New diplomatic efforts may result in an appropriate disposition of a substantial number of individuals currently detained at Guantánamo. Some individuals currently detained at Guantánamo may have committed offenses for which they should be prosecuted. It is in the interests of the United States to review whether and how any such individuals can and should be prosecuted.

It is in the interests of the United States that the executive branch conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantánamo who have been charged with offenses before military commissions pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109–366, as well as of the military commission process more generally.

**Sec. 3. Closure of Detention Facilities at Guantánamo.** The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

**Sec. 4. Immediate Review of All Guantánamo Detentions.**

(a) **Scope and Timing of Review.** A review of the status of each individual currently detained at Guantánamo (Review) shall commence immediately.

(b) **Review Participants.** The Review shall be conducted with the full cooperation and participation of the following officials:

1. the Attorney General, who shall coordinate the Review;
2. the Secretary of Defense;
3. the Secretary of State;
4. the Secretary of Homeland Security;
5. the Director of National Intelligence;
6. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
7. other officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States, including employees with intelligence, counterterrorism, military, and legal expertise, as determined by the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned.

(c) **Operation of Review.** The duties of the Review participants shall include the following:

1. **Consolidation of Detainee Information.** The Attorney General shall, to the extent reasonably practicable, and in coordination with the other Review participants, assemble all information in the possession of the
Federal Government that pertains to any individual currently detained at Guantánamo and that is relevant to determining the proper disposition of any such individual. All executive branch departments and agencies shall promptly comply with any request of the Attorney General to provide information in their possession or control pertaining to any such individual. The Attorney General may seek further information relevant to the Review from any source.

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(2) **Determination of Transfer.** The Review shall determine, on a rolling basis and as promptly as possible with respect to the individuals currently detained at Guantánamo, whether it is possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how the Secretary of Defense may effect their transfer or release. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and, as appropriate, other Review participants shall work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible.

(3) **Determination of Prosecution.** In accordance with United States law, the cases of individuals detained at Guantánamo not approved for release or transfer shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they may have committed, including whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals before a court established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, and the Review participants shall in turn take the necessary and appropriate steps based on such determinations.

(4) **Determination of Other Disposition.** With respect to any individuals currently detained at Guantánamo whose disposition is not achieved under paragraphs (2) or (3) of this subsection, the Review shall select lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, for the disposition of such individuals. The appropriate authorities shall promptly implement such dispositions.

(5) **Consideration of Issues Relating to Transfer to the United States.** The Review shall identify and consider legal, logistical, and security issues relating to the potential transfer of individuals currently detained at Guantánamo to facilities within the United States, and the Review participants shall work with the Congress on any legislation that may be appropriate.

**Sec. 5. Diplomatic Efforts.** The Secretary of State shall expeditiously pursue and direct such negotiations and diplomatic efforts with foreign governments as are necessary and appropriate to implement this order.

**Sec. 6. Humane Standards of Confinement.** No individual currently detained at Guantánamo shall be held in the custody or under the effective control of any officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or at a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, except in conformity with all applicable laws governing the conditions of such confinement, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Secretary of Defense shall immediately undertake a review of the conditions of detention at Guantánamo to ensure full compliance with this directive. Such review shall be completed within 30 days and any necessary corrections shall be implemented immediately thereafter.

**Sec. 7. Military Commissions.** The Secretary of Defense shall immediately take steps sufficient to ensure that during the pendency of the Review
described in section 4 of this order, no charges are sworn, or referred
to a military commission under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and
the Rules for Military Commissions, and that all proceedings of such military
commissions to which charges have been referred but in which no judgment
has been rendered, and all proceedings pending in the United States Court
of Military Commission Review, are halted.

Sec. 8. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall prejudice the authority of the Secretary
of Defense to determine the disposition of any detainees not covered by
this order.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and
subject to the availability of appropriations.

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(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party
against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 22, 2009.
APPENDIX F REFERENCE

APPENDIX G
Executive Order 13493 of January 22, 2009
Review of Detention Policy Options
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to develop policies for the detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations that are consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, I hereby order as follows:

Section 1. Special Interagency Task Force on Detainee Disposition.
(a) Establishment of Special Interagency Task Force. There shall be established a Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition (Special Task Force) to identify lawful options for the disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.
(b) Membership. The Special Task Force shall consist of the following members, or their designees:
(i) the Attorney General, who shall serve as Co-Chair;
(ii) the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as Co-Chair;
(iii) the Secretary of State;
(iv) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(v) the Director of National Intelligence;
(vi) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(vii) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
(viii) other officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States, as determined by either of the Co-Chairs, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned.
(c) Staff. Either Co-Chair may designate officers and employees within their respective departments to serve as staff to support the Special Task Force. At the request of the Co-Chairs, officers and employees from other departments or agencies may serve on the Special Task Force with the concurrence of the heads of the departments or agencies that employ such individuals. Such staff must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States. The Co-Chairs shall jointly select an officer or employee of the Department of Justice or Department of Defense to serve as the Executive Secretary of the Special Task Force.
(d) Operation. The Co-Chairs shall convene meetings of the Special Task Force, determine its agenda, and direct its work. The Co-Chairs may establish and direct subgroups of the Special Task Force, consisting exclusively of members of the Special Task Force, to deal with particular subjects.
(e) Mission. The mission of the Special Task Force shall be to conduct a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.
Administration. The Special Task Force shall be established for administrative purposes within the Department of Justice, and the Department of Justice shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, provide administrative support and funding for the Special Task Force.

Report. The Special Task Force shall provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Counsel to the President, on the matters set forth in subsection (d) within 180 days of the date of this order unless the Co-Chairs determine that an extension is necessary, and shall provide periodic preliminary reports during those 180 days.

Termination. The Co-Chairs shall terminate the Special Task Force upon the completion of its duties.

Sec. 2. General Provisions.
(a) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(b) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 22, 2009.
APPENDIX G REFERENCE

2009 Nobel Award Ceremony Speech

Presentation Speech by Thorbjørn Jagland, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, 10 December 2009.

Your Majesties, Mr. President and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Your Royal Highnesses, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

On the 9th of October this year, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 was to be awarded to President Barack H. Obama "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples. The Committee has attached special importance to Obama's vision of and work for a world free from nuclear weapons".

Commenting on the award, President Obama said he did not feel that he deserved to be in the company of so many transformative figures that have been honoured by this prize, and whose courageous pursuit of peace has inspired the world. But he added that he also knew that the Nobel Prize had not just been used to honor specific achievements, but also to give momentum to a set of causes. The Prize could thus represent "a call to action".

President Obama has understood the Norwegian Nobel Committee perfectly. We congratulate him on this year's Nobel Peace Prize!

This year's award must be viewed in the light of the prevailing situation in the world, with great tension, numerous wars, unresolved conflicts and confrontation on many fronts around the world. And, not least, there is the imminent danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, degradation of the environment and global warming. In fact, Time Magazine recently described the decade that is coming to an end as the worst since the end of World War II.

From the very first moment of his presidency, President Obama has been trying to create a more cooperative climate which can help reverse the present trend. He has already "lowered the temperature in the world", in the words of former Peace Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu.

The Committee always takes Alfred Nobel's will as its frame of reference. We are to award the Nobel Peace Prize to the person who, during the "preceding year", meaning in this case since the previous award in December 2008, shall have done the most or the best work "for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses" – to quote from the will.
The question was actually quite simple. Who has done most for peace in the past year? If the question is put in Nobel's terms, the answer is relatively easy to find: it had to be U.S. President Barack Obama. Only rarely does one person dominate international politics to the same extent as Obama, or in such a short space of time initiate so many and such major changes as Obama has done. The question for the Committee was rather whether it would be bold enough to single out the most powerful man in the world, with the responsibility and the obligations that come with the office of the President of the United States.

The Committee came to the conclusion that it must still be possible to award the Nobel Peace Prize to a political leader. We cannot get the world on a safer track without political leadership. And time is short. Many have argued that the prize comes too early. But history can tell us a great deal about lost opportunities.

It is now, today, that we have the opportunity to support President Obama's ideas. This year's prize is indeed a call to action to all of us.

The Committee knows that many will weigh his ideals against what he really does, and that should be welcomed. But if the demand is either to fulfil your ideals to the letter, and at once, or to stop having ideals, we are left with a most damaging division between the limits of today's realities and the vision for tomorrow. Then politics becomes pure cynicism. Political leaders must be able to think beyond the often narrow confines of realpolitik. Only in this way can we move the world in the right direction.

Obama has achieved a great deal. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld said that "the U.N. was not created to take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell". The U.S.A. is now paying its bills to the U.N. It is joining various committees, and acceding to important conventions. International standards are again respected. Torture is forbidden; the President is doing what he can to close Guantanamo. Human rights and international law are guiding principles. This is why this year's Laureate has earned the praise of the leaders of international institutions. New opportunities have been created.

Your Majesties, Mr. President, Your Royal Highnesses, ladies and gentlemen,

The vision of a world free from nuclear weapons has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations. Under Obama's leadership, the U.N. Security Council gave its unanimous support to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The new administration in Washington has reconsidered the deployment in Eastern Europe of the planned anti-missile defences and is instead looking at other multilateral options to secure the region. This has contributed to an improved atmosphere in the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons between the U.S.A. and the Russian Federation. A new agreement between them will, we hope, soon be on the table.
We can see how the vision of a world without nuclear weapons is encouraging even the smaller nuclear powers to make cuts. And we can certainly not prevent the spread of nuclear arms to new countries unless the established nuclear powers meet their obligations. That was the clear premise underlying the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it still applies today. The important Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is being held next year. Either the nuclear powers will clearly signal their willingness to disarm, or the conference may prove a fiasco, with the danger of a new arms race. President Obama has sent his signal.

In today's Washington, dialogue and negotiations are the preferred instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The United States is no longer on the sidelines regarding the nuclear program in Iran. As the President put it in his inaugural address: "...we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist". There is no guarantee that negotiations always succeed, but in Obama’s opinion the U.S.A. is obliged to try. If the outstretched hand continues to meet a clenched fist, the global community will then stand more united in its further response.

Obama has insisted that the U.S.A. has to build coalitions and make friends rather than to create enemies. He is pursuing this strategy also in Afghanistan. The struggle against violent extremism in Afghanistan rests on broad international foundations and is supported actively by many governments around the world. In the long run, however, the problems in Afghanistan can be solved only by the Afghans themselves. This is also the basic logic behind the President's new strategy there.

Regarding the fight against climate change, we can see the same underlying idea: the U.S.A. cannot be indifferent to global challenges; while it cannot solve such challenges alone, they cannot be met without the U.S.A. Obama has presented concrete proposals for what the U.S.A. will do. This has improved chances of reaching an effective global agreement, if not this year then, we hope, at least next year.

China is steadily moving to the forefront of international politics and the global economy. There has been a sense in America that many of the greatest challenges can only be met in close cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. For instance, no country has polluted more than the U.S.A., and no country will pollute more than China in the future. The economies of the two countries are closely intertwined. The rise of new Great Powers often leads to war and conflict. There are those in America who fear that history may repeat itself in that respect. The Obama administration's cooperation with Beijing means that we have little reason to fear such a repetition.

Obama's diplomacy rests on the idea that whoever is to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world’s population. That was how they put it, those earlier American presidents who, above all others, were seen as world leaders also outside the United States: Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. America’s ideals were the world's ideals: they lived, in Reagan's words, "not only in the hearts and minds of our
countrymen but in the hearts and minds of millions of the world's people in both free and oppressed societies who look to us for leadership”.

Obama's ideals coincide to a large extent with the ideals that have underpinned the activities of the Norwegian Nobel Committee throughout our 108-year history: to strengthen international institutions as much as possible; to advance democracy and human rights; to reduce the importance of arms and preferably do away with nuclear arms altogether; to promote dialogue and negotiations; and, in the last few years, to adopt effective measures to meet the climate threat.

Looking at the history of the Nobel Prize, we can see several examples of awards to persons or institutions that have achieved fundamental agreements or other results which have stood the test of history. We will find at least as many awards that have gone to those who tried to bring about fundamental changes in international politics, but where the results were still unclear at the time when they received their awards. Woodrow Wilson's prize came when he was at his weakest both politically and personally, after suffering a stroke. He had created the League of Nations, but the United States would not join. Wilson was a hero to the world, but not in the U.S.A. The American Secretary of State Cordell Hull received the award after the establishment of the United Nations, but so early that no one could be sure how significant the U.N. would be.

Many have been awarded the Peace Prize for their courage, even when the results for a long time seemed modest: Carl von Ossietzky, Andrej Sakharov, Lech Walesa and the Dalai Lama, to name a few. When Albert Lutuli received his Peace Prize, the struggle against apartheid was in its infancy: there were few results to point to. When Martin Luther King, Jr., received his award, he had proclaimed his dream that "my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character", but there was still a long way to go from dream to reality.

Mr. President, we are happy to see that through your presence here so much of Dr. King's dream has come true.

In the Middle East, there have been many wars, and many Peace Prizes have been awarded. Why does the Nobel Committee not wait until final peace agreements have been concluded? Nothing is final in history. It always moves on. Peace must be built again and again. The Norwegian Nobel Committee can not award a Peace Prize where nothing has been achieved. If the principles are important enough, however, and the struggle over them is vital to the future of the world, the Committee can not wait until we are certain that the principles have won on all fronts. That would make the Prize a rather belated stamp of approval and not an instrument for peace in the world.

Your Majesties, Mr. President, Your Royal Highnesses, ladies and gentlemen,
Mr. President, in both the First and the Second World War, your great country came to Europe’s rescue. We will never forget that. After the First World War, Woodrow Wilson sought to build a world founded on international cooperation and democracy. His success was limited. During and after the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman took initiatives to create the United Nations and other global institutions. Their creation still lives on today. The lesson was that the power of nation states could not be unlimited. States must commit themselves to international law and universal rights. The world moved away from unrestrained nation states and towards greater internationalism.

Today yet another American president is trying to renew internationalism. He reaffirms that the U.S.A. must lead together with others. Walls must be torn down. As he put it in his speech in Berlin in July 2008: "The walls between old allies on either side of the Atlantic cannot stand. The walls between the countries with the most and those with the least cannot stand. The walls between races and tribes; natives and immigrants; Christians and Muslims and Jews cannot stand. These now are the walls we must tear down".

This must surely be Nobel's "fraternity between nations".

Your Majesties, Mr. President, Your Royal Highnesses, ladies and gentlemen,

President Obama is a political leader who understands that even the mightiest are vulnerable when they stand alone. He is a man who believes in the strength of a community, be it the local community where he started his career many years ago or the global community which he leads today. Obama has the audacity to hope and the tenacity to make these hopes come true.

This is what makes him so important. By his own behaviour and leadership he is demanding that we all "take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges".

We congratulate this year's Laureate, President Barack H. Obama, on what he has already achieved, and wish him every possible success in his continuing efforts for a more peaceful world. May you receive the help you truly deserve!
APPENDIX H REFERENCE

APPENDIX I
A Just and Lasting Peace
Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, distinguished members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, citizens of America, and citizens of the world:
I receive this honor with deep gratitude and great humility. It is an award that speaks to our highest aspirations – that for all the cruelty and hardship of our world, we are not mere prisoners of fate. Our actions matter, and can bend history in the direction of justice. And yet I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the considerable controversy that your generous decision has generated. (Laughter.) In part, this is because I am at the beginning, and not the end, of my labors on the world stage. Compared to some of the giants of history who’ve received this prize – Schweitzer and King; Marshall and Mandela – my accomplishments are slight. And then there are the men and women around the world who have been jailed and beaten in the pursuit of justice; those who toil in humanitarian organizations to relieve suffering; the unrecognized millions whose quiet acts of courage and compassion inspire even the most hardened cynics. I cannot argue with those who find these men and women – some known, some obscure to all but those they help – to be far more deserving of this honor than I.
But perhaps the most profound issue surrounding my receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the Commander-in-Chief of the military of a nation in the midst of two wars. One of these wars is winding down. The other is a conflict that America did not seek; one in which we are joined by 42 other countries – including Norway – in an effort to defend ourselves and all nations from further attacks.
Still, we are at war, and I’m responsible for the deployment of thousands of young Americans to battle in a distant land. Some will kill, and some will be killed. And so I come here with an acute sense of the costs of armed conflict – filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one with the other.
Now these questions are not new. War, in one form or another, appeared with the first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a fact, like drought or disease – the manner in which tribes and then civilizations sought power and settled their differences.
And over time, as codes of law sought to control violence within groups, so did philosophers and clerics and statesmen seek to regulate the destructive power of war. The concept of a "just war" emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.
Of course, we know that for most of history, this concept of "just war" was rarely observed. The capacity of human beings to think up new ways to kill one another proved
inexhaustible, as did our capacity to exempt from mercy those who look different or pray to a different God. Wars between armies gave way to wars between nations – total wars in which the distinction between combatant and civilian became blurred. In the span of 30 years, such carnage would twice engulf this continent. And while it's hard to conceive of a cause more just than the defeat of the Third Reich and the Axis powers, World War II was a conflict in which the total number of civilians who died exceeded the number of soldiers who perished.

In the wake of such destruction, and with the advent of the nuclear age, it became clear to victor and vanquished alike that the world needed institutions to prevent another world war. And so, a quarter century after the United States Senate rejected the League of Nations – an idea for which Woodrow Wilson received this prize – America led the world in constructing an architecture to keep the peace: a Marshall Plan and a United Nations, mechanisms to govern the waging of war, treaties to protect human rights, prevent genocide, restrict the most dangerous weapons.

In many ways, these efforts succeeded. Yes, terrible wars have been fought, and atrocities committed. But there has been no Third World War. The Cold War ended with jubilant crowds dismantling a wall. Commerce has stitched much of the world together. Billions have been lifted from poverty. The ideals of liberty and self-determination, equality and the rule of law have haltingly advanced. We are the heirs of the fortitude and foresight of generations past, and it is a legacy for which my own country is rightfully proud.

And yet, a decade into a new century, this old architecture is buckling under the weight of new threats. The world may no longer shudder at the prospect of war between two nuclear superpowers, but proliferation may increase the risk of catastrophe. Terrorism has long been a tactic, but modern technology allows a few small men with outsized rage to murder innocents on a horrific scale.

Moreover, wars between nations have increasingly given way to wars within nations. The resurgence of ethnic or sectarian conflicts; the growth of secessionist movements, insurgencies, and failed states – all these things have increasingly trapped civilians in unending chaos. In today's wars, many more civilians are killed than soldiers; the seeds of future conflict are sown, economies are wrecked, civil societies torn asunder, refugees amassed, children scarred.

I do not bring with me today a definitive solution to the problems of war. What I do know is that meeting these challenges will require the same vision, hard work, and persistence of those men and women who acted so boldly decades ago. And it will require us to think in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.

We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.

I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak – nothing passive – nothing naïve – in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.
But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.

I raise this point, I begin with this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter what the cause. And at times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world's sole military superpower. But the world must remember that it was not simply international institutions – not just treaties and declarations – that brought stability to a post-World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.

So yes, the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must coexist with another – that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier's courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades in arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such.

So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths – that war is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an expression of human folly. Concretely, we must direct our effort to the task that President Kennedy called for long ago. "Let us focus," he said, "on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions." A gradual evolution of human institutions.

What might this evolution look like? What might these practical steps be?

To begin with, I believe that all nations – strong and weak alike – must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. I – like any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don't.

The world rallied around America after the 9/11 attacks, and continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan, because of the horror of those senseless attacks and the recognized principle of self-defense. Likewise, the world recognized the need to confront Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait – a consensus that sent a clear message to all about the cost of aggression.

Furthermore, America – in fact, no nation – can insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we don't, our actions appear arbitrary and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified.
And this becomes particularly important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of one nation against an aggressor. More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.

I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That's why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.

America's commitment to global security will never waver. But in a world in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex, America cannot act alone. America alone cannot secure the peace. This is true in Afghanistan. This is true in failed states like Somalia, where terrorism and piracy is joined by famine and human suffering. And sadly, it will continue to be true in unstable regions for years to come.

The leaders and soldiers of NATO countries, and other friends and allies, demonstrate this truth through the capacity and courage they've shown in Afghanistan. But in many countries, there is a disconnect between the efforts of those who serve and the ambivalence of the broader public. I understand why war is not popular, but I also know this: The belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it. Peace requires responsibility. Peace entails sacrifice. That's why NATO continues to be indispensable. That's why we must strengthen U.N. and regional peacekeeping, and not leave the task to a few countries. That's why we honor those who return home from peacekeeping and training abroad to Oslo and Rome; to Ottawa and Sydney; to Dhaka and Kigali – we honor them not as makers of war, but as wagers of peace.

Let me make one final point about the use of force. Even as we make difficult decisions about going to war, we must also think clearly about how we fight it. The Nobel Committee recognized this truth in awarding its first prize for peace to Henry Dunant – the founder of the Red Cross, and a driving force behind the Geneva Conventions. Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we honor – we honor those ideals by upholding them not when it's easy, but when it is hard.

I have spoken at some length to the question that must weigh on our minds and our hearts as we choose to wage war. But let me now turn to our effort to avoid such tragic choices, and speak of three ways that we can build a just and lasting peace.

First, in dealing with those nations that break rules and laws, I believe that we must develop alternatives to violence that are tough enough to actually change behavior – for if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions must
exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure – and such pressure exists only when the world stands together as one.

One urgent example is the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to seek a world without them. In the middle of the last century, nations agreed to be bound by a treaty whose bargain is clear: All will have access to peaceful nuclear power; those without nuclear weapons will forsake them; and those with nuclear weapons will work towards disarmament. I am committed to upholding this treaty. It is a centerpiece of my foreign policy. And I'm working with President Medvedev to reduce America and Russia's nuclear stockpiles.

But it is also incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. Those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted. Those who care for their own security cannot ignore the danger of an arms race in the Middle East or East Asia. Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.

The same principle applies to those who violate international laws by brutalizing their own people. When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma – there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy – but there must be consequences when those things fail. And the closer we stand together, the less likely we will be faced with the choice between armed intervention and complicity in oppression.

This brings me to a second point – the nature of the peace that we seek. For peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace based on the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting.

It was this insight that drove drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the Second World War. In the wake of devastation, they recognized that if human rights are not protected, peace is a hollow promise.

And yet too often, these words are ignored. For some countries, the failure to uphold human rights is excused by the false suggestion that these are somehow Western principles, foreign to local cultures or stages of a nation's development. And within America, there has long been a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists – a tension that suggests a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values around the world.

I reject these choices. I believe that peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without fear. Pent-up grievances fester, and the suppression of tribal and religious identity can lead to violence. We also know that the opposite is true. Only when Europe became free did it finally find peace. America has never fought a war against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their citizens. No matter how callously defined, neither America's interests – nor the world's – are served by the denial of human aspirations.

So even as we respect the unique culture and traditions of different countries, America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal. We will bear witness to the quiet dignity of reformers like Aung Sang Suu Kyi; to the bravery of Zimbabweans who cast their ballots in the face of beatings; to the hundreds of thousands who have marched silently through the streets of Iran. It is telling that the leaders of these governments fear
the aspirations of their own people more than the power of any other nation. And it is the responsibility of all free people and free nations to make clear that these movements – these movements of hope and history – they have us on their side.

Let me also say this: The promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone. At times, it must be coupled with painstaking diplomacy. I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without outreach – condemnation without discussion – can carry forward only a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path unless it has the choice of an open door.

In light of the Cultural Revolution's horrors, Nixon's meeting with Mao appeared inexcusable – and yet it surely helped set China on a path where millions of its citizens have been lifted from poverty and connected to open societies. Pope John Paul's engagement with Poland created space not just for the Catholic Church, but for labor leaders like Lech Walesa. Ronald Reagan's efforts on arms control and embrace of perestroika not only improved relations with the Soviet Union, but empowered dissidents throughout Eastern Europe. There's no simple formula here. But we must try as best we can to balance isolation and engagement, pressure and incentives, so that human rights and dignity are advanced over time.

Third, a just peace includes not only civil and political rights – it must encompass economic security and opportunity. For true peace is not just freedom from fear, but freedom from want.

It is undoubtedly true that development rarely takes root without security; it is also true that security does not exist where human beings do not have access to enough food, or clean water, or the medicine and shelter they need to survive. It does not exist where children can't aspire to a decent education or a job that supports a family. The absence of hope can rot a society from within.

And that's why helping farmers feed their own people – or nations educate their children and care for the sick – is not mere charity. It's also why the world must come together to confront climate change. There is little scientific dispute that if we do nothing, we will face more drought, more famine, more mass displacement – all of which will fuel more conflict for decades. For this reason, it is not merely scientists and environmental activists who call for swift and forceful action – it's military leaders in my own country and others who understand our common security hangs in the balance.

Agreements among nations. Strong institutions. Support for human rights. Investments in development. All these are vital ingredients in bringing about the evolution that President Kennedy spoke about. And yet, I do not believe that we will have the will, the determination, the staying power, to complete this work without something more – and that's the continued expansion of our moral imagination; an insistence that there's something irreducible that we all share.

As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish
in their particular identities – their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict. At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards. We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden. We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines. And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan. These extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war. For if you truly believe that you are carrying out divine will, then there is no need for restraint – no need to spare the pregnant mother, or the medic, or the Red Cross worker, or even a person of one's own faith. Such a warped view of religion is not just incompatible with the concept of peace, but I believe it's incompatible with the very purpose of faith – for the one rule that lies at the heart of every major religion is that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Adhering to this law of love has always been the core struggle of human nature. For we are fallible. We make mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations of pride, and power, and sometimes evil. Even those of us with the best of intentions will at times fail to right the wrongs before us.

But we do not have to think that human nature is perfect for us to still believe that the human condition can be perfected. We do not have to live in an idealized world to still reach for those ideals that will make it a better place. The non-violence practiced by men like Gandhi and King may not have been practical or possible in every circumstance, but the love that they preached – their fundamental faith in human progress – that must always be the North Star that guides us on our journey.

For if we lose that faith – if we dismiss it as silly or naïve; if we divorce it from the decisions that we make on issues of war and peace – then we lose what's best about humanity. We lose our sense of possibility. We lose our moral compass. Like generations have before us, we must reject that future. As Dr. King said at this occasion so many years ago, "I refuse to accept despair as the final response to the ambiguities of history. I refuse to accept the idea that the 'isness' of man's present condition makes him morally incapable of reaching up for the eternal 'oughtness' that forever confronts him."

Let us reach for the world that ought to be – that spark of the divine that still stirs within each of our souls. Somewhere today, in the here and now, in the world as it is, a soldier sees he's outgunned, but stands firm to keep the peace. Somewhere today, in this world, a young protestor awaits the brutality of her government, but has the courage to march on. Somewhere today, a mother facing punishing poverty still takes the time to teach her child, scrapes together what few coins she has to send that child to school – because she believes that a cruel world still has a place for that child's dreams. Let us live by their example. We can acknowledge that oppression will always be with us, and still strive for justice. We can admit the intractability of depravation, and still strive for dignity. Clear-eyed, we can understand that there will be war, and still strive for peace. We can do that – for that is the story of human progress; that's the hope of all the world; and at this moment of challenge, that must be our work here on Earth.
Thank you very much.
APPENDIX I REFERENCE