Masters Thesis

A passive aggressive power: the U.S. confronts Russia over Manchuria, 1898-1905

The conventional view of American Foreign Relations is that, at the end of the 19th century, the United States began a shift in the way it conducted foreign policy. With the American frontier declared closed, Americans looked across the Pacific Ocean for new markets as a solution to domestic economic problems. As a result, the United States entered into the game of international empire, competing alongside European powers like Britain and Russia. Because American sights were set on the Chinese region of Manchuria, this put the United States at odds with the Russia, who at the same time was looking to increase the reach of its empire in East Asia. This thesis examines relations between Russia and the United States from 1898 to 1905, when U.S. policymakers attempted to prevent Russian domination of Manchuria because they believed it threatened American commerce there. But, by analyzing the policies of U.S. Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt during the Manchurian crisis, their actions challenge the conventional view that American foreign policy went through a seismic shift in the late 1900s. This thesis shows that those administrations continued to espouse the established tenets of nineteenth-century American foreign policy by working to avoid either entangling alliance with European Powers or a costly overseas war. Without those important tools of diplomacy, U.S. policymakers resorted to a passive aggressive policy, indirectly attempting to gain Russia’s compliance with American policy without the threat of force.

Chico State is committed to accessibility. If you have any problems accessing this material, please contact the Accessibility Resource Center at (530) 898-5959 or submit an Accessible Content service ticket.

Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.