Nothing less than a disaster: Henry Kissinger, the Munich Olympics attack, and the October War

This thesis examines what led to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s surprise and shock when war broke out between Israel and Egypt in October 1973. During President Richard M. Nixon’s first term, Kissinger, as Nixon’s National Security Advisor sparred with then Secretary of State, William Rogers, dismissing and undermining the State Department’s policy toward the Middle East in a quest to gain more power and influence. For Kissinger, the conflict in the Middle East served as a bargaining chip with the Soviets, a way to gain diplomatic traction and neutralize Soviet influence. Instead of working to solve the Middle East problems, Kissinger’s policy aimed to keep the Middle East mired in the status quo, much to the chagrin of Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Finally, U.S. policy on the Middle East under Kissinger’s direction remained unexamined despite the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the subsequent Israeli retribution for those violent acts. Because of these reasons, Kissinger was surprised when the October War broke out. Kissinger’s inaction in failing to anticipate the war had a negative impact on the achievement of important U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.