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dc.contributor Thomas, Matthew en
dc.contributor.advisor Wilking, Jennifer R. en
dc.contributor.author Anderson-Nilsson, Georgia en
dc.contributor.other Dwyre, Diana en
dc.date.accessioned 2016-09-26T20:14:13Z en
dc.date.available 2016-09-26T20:14:13Z en
dc.date.issued 2016-09-26 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10211.3/177922 en
dc.description.abstract Public investment in collectivistic goods in rural areas in the developing world has been shown to be far more effective than particularistic investment in private goods for rural poverty alleviation. However, governments in Latin America generally prioritize private goods. Given that political institutions create varying incentives for democratically elected political actors to cater to the interests of different constituencies, this thesis asks whether the choice to pursue particularistic rather than public policies in rural areas can be systematically explained by political institutions. Specifically, I perform quantitative, cross-national tests to determine whether variance in decentralization, in the use of closed-list proportional representation, and in mean district magnitude correlate with lower levels of rural poverty and urban-rural poverty disparity. I provide qualitative case studies of Uruguay and Peru, to illustrate the ways in which political institutions create incentives for rural investment. I find that different aspects of decentralization and closed-list proportional representation impact rural poverty in different ways across different democratic and demographic contexts. The results of this analysis also suggest that the interactive effects of these institutional variables mediate their impact on the representation of rural interests in government. en
dc.description.sponsorship CSU, Chico en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.subject Political policy en
dc.subject Latin America en
dc.subject Uruguay en
dc.subject Peru en
dc.subject Rural poor en
dc.subject Political incentives en
dc.title Representing rural interests: poverty, policy choice, and institutional incentives in Latin America en
dc.college Behavioral and Social Sciences en
dc.program Political Science en
dc.degree MA en


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